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Abstract—Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency that records all
transactions in a distributed append-only public ledger called
blockchain. The security of Bitcoin heavily relies on the incentive-
compatible proof-of-work (PoW) based distributed consensus
protocol, which is run by network nodes called miners. In
exchange for the incentive, the miners are expected to honestly
maintain the blockchain. Since its launch in 2009, Bitcoin econ-
omy has grown at an enormous rate, and it is now worth about
170 billions of dollars. This exponential growth in the market
value of Bitcoin motivates adversaries to exploit weaknesses for
profit, and researchers to discover new vulnerabilities in the
system, propose countermeasures, and predict upcoming trends.
In this paper, we present a systematic survey that covers the
security and privacy aspects of Bitcoin. We start by presenting an
overview of the Bitcoin protocol and its major components along
with their functionality and interactions within the system. We
review the existing vulnerabilities in Bitcoin and its underlying
major technologies such as blockchain and PoW based consensus
protocol. These vulnerabilities lead to the execution of various
security threats to the normal functionality of Bitcoin. We
then discuss the feasibility and robustness of the state-of-the-
art security solutions. Additionally, we present current privacy
and anonymity considerations in Bitcoin and discuss the privacy-
related threats to Bitcoin users along with the analysis of the
existing privacy-preserving solutions. Finally, we summarize the
critical open challenges and suggest directions for future research
towards provisioning stringent security and privacy techniques
for Bitcoin.
Index Terms—Bitcoins, cryptocurrency, security threats, user
privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
B ITCOIN uses peer-to-peer (P2P) technology, and it op-erates without any trusted third party authority that may
appear as a bank, a Chartered Accountant (CA), a notary, or
any other centralized service [1]. In particular, an owner has
full control over its bitcoins, and she could spend them anytime
and anywhere without involving any centralized authority.
Bitcoin design is open-source and nobody owns or controls it.
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Moreover, it is a cryptographically secure electronic payment
system, and it enables transactions involving virtual currency
in the form of digital tokens called Bitcoin coins (BTC or
simply bitcoins).
Since its deployment in 2009, Bitcoin has attracted a lots
of attention from both academia and industry. With a market
capitalization of 170 billion and more than 375,000 aggregate
number of confirmed transactions per day (December 2017),
Bitcoin is the most successful cryptocurrency to date. Given
the amount of money at stake, Bitcoin is an obvious target
for adversaries. Indeed, numerous attacks have been described
targeting different aspects of the system, including double
spending [2], netsplit [3], transaction malleability [4], net-
working attacks [5], or attacks targeting mining [6] [7] [8] and
mining pools [9]. In [10], authors claim that “Bitcoin works in
practice and not in theory” due to the lack of security research
to find out theoretical foundation for Bitcoin protocols. Until
today, the incomplete existence of a robust theoretical base
forces the security research community for dismissing the
use of bitcoins. Existing security solutions for Bitcoin lacks
the required measures that could ensure an adequate level
of security for its users. We believe that security solutions
should cover all the major protocols running critical functions
in Bitcoin, such as blockchain, consensus, key management,
and networking protocols. Although, the online communities
have already started to use bitcoins with the belief that Bitcoin
will soon take over the online trading business. For instance,
“Wiki leaks” request its users to donate using the bitcoins.
The request quote is “Bitcoin is a secure and anonymous
digital currency, bitcoins cannot be easily tracked back to you,
and are safer, and are the faster alternative to other donation
methods”. Wiki leaks also support the use of Litecoin, another
cryptocurrency, for the same reason [11].
Recently, Bitcoin technology is grabbing lots of attention
from government bodies due to its increasing use by the
malicious users to undermine legal controls. In [12], authors
call bitcoins “Enigmatic and Controversial Digital Cryptocur-
rency” due to mysterious concepts underneath the Bitcoin
system and severe opposition from the government. According
to [13], the current bitcoin exchange rate is approximately
USD 13k (as of December 2017) from around 1000 dollars at
the start of 2016. The major technologies such as blockchain
and consensus protocols that makes the Bitcoin a huge success
will now also being envisioned in various next-generation
applications, including smart trading in smart grids [14],
Internet of Things (IoT) [15] [16], vehicular networks [17],
healthcare data management [18], and smart cities [19], to
name a few. As the length of popularity largely depends on
the amount of security built on the system which surpasses all
its other benefits, we aim to investigate the associated security
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and privacy issues in Bitcoin and its underlying techniques.
A. Contribution
In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey specif-
ically targeting the security and privacy aspects of Bitcoin
and its related concepts. We discuss the state-of-the-art attack
vector which includes various user security and transaction
anonymity threats that limits (or threatens) the applicability (or
continuity) of bitcoins in real-world applications and services.
We also discuss the efficiency of various security solutions that
are proposed over the years to address the existing security and
privacy challenges in Bitcoin. In particular, we mainly focus on
the security challenges and their countermeasures with respect
to major components of Bitcoin. In addition, we discuss the
issues of user privacy and transaction anonymity along with a
large array of research that has been done for enabling privacy
and improving anonymity in Bitcoin.
In the literature, [20] provides a comprehensive technical
survey on decentralized digital currencies with mainly em-
phasizing on bitcoins. The authors explore the technical back-
ground of Bitcoin and discuss the implications of the central
design decisions for various Bitcoin technologies. In [10],
authors discuss various cryptocurrencies in detail and provides
a preliminary overview of the advantages and disadvantages
of the use of bitcoins. However, all the existing works lack a
detailed survey about security and privacy aspects of Bitcoin,
and are a bit outdated, given the extensive research was done
in the last couple of years on security and privacy. Moreover,
there are numerous papers on Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency
security and privacy however, a concise survey is required
for an audience who are planning to initiate research in this
direction. This paper does not attempt to solve any new
challenge but presents an overview and discussion of the
Bitcoin security and privacy threats along with their available
countermeasures. In particular, the main contributions of this
survey are as follow.
• We present the essential background knowledge for Bit-
coin, its functionalities, and related concepts. The goal is
to enable the new readers to get the required familiarity
with the Bitcoin and its underlying technologies such as
transactions, blockchain, and consensus protocols. This is
required in order to understand, the working methodol-
ogy, benefits, and challenges that are associated with the
use of bitcoins.
• We systematically present and discuss all the existing
security and privacy related threats that are associated
either directly or indirectly (i.e., by exploiting one of
its underlying technology) with the use of bitcoins. At
various levels of its overall operation, we investigate the
possibilities, which includes both practical and theoretical
risks that an adversary could exploit to launch an attack
on the Bitcoin.
• We discuss the efficiency and limitations of the state-
of-the-art solutions that address the security threats and
enables strong privacy in Bitcoin, thus we provide a
holistic technical perspective on these challenges in the
use of bitcoins. Finally, based on our survey, we provide
the list of lessons learned, open issues, and directions for
future work.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey that dis-
cusses and highlights the impact of existing as well as possible
future security and privacy threats Bitcoin and its associated
technologies. The paper aims to assist the interested readers:
(i) to understand the scope and impact of security and privacy
challenges in Bitcoin, (ii) to estimate the possible damage
caused by these threats, and (iii) to point in the direction
that will possibly lead to the detection and containment of
the identified threats. In particular, the goal of our research
is to raise the awareness in the Bitcoin research community
on the pressing requirement to prevent various attacks from
disrupting the cryptocurrency. For most of the security threats
discussed in this paper, we have no evidence that such attacks
have already been performed on Bitcoin. However, we believe
that some of the important characteristics of Bitcoin make
these attacks practical and potentially highly disruptive. These
characteristics include the high centralization of Bitcoin (from
a mining and routing perspective), the lack of authentication
and integrity checks for network nodes, and some design
choices pertaining, for instance, how in the Bitcoin network a
node requests a block.
B. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In Section II, we
present a brief overview of Bitcoin which includes the descrip-
tion of its major components along with their functionalities
and interactions. In Section III, we discuss a number of secu-
rity threats associated with the development, implementation,
and use of bitcoins. In Section IV, we discuss the state-of-
the-art proposals that either countermeasure a security threat
or enhances the existing security in Bitcoin. In Section V, we
discuss the anonymity and privacy threats towards the use of
bitcoins along with their existing solutions. We present the
summary of the observations and future research directions
that are learned from our survey in Section VI. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. OVERVIEW OF BITCOIN
Bitcoin is a decentralized electronic payment system intro-
duced by Nakamoto [1]. It is based on peer-to-peer (P2P)
network and a probabilistic distributed consensus protocol. In
Bitcoin, electronic payments are done by generating transac-
tions that transfer bitcoins among users. The destination ad-
dress (also called Bitcoin address) is generated by performing
a series of irreversible cryptographic hashing operations on
the user’s public key. In Bitcoin, a user can have multiple ad-
dresses by generating multiple public keys and these addresses
could be associated with one or more of her wallets [21]. The
private key of the user is required to spend the owned bitcoins
in the form of digitally signed transactions. Using the hash
of the public key as a receiving address provides the users
a certain degree of anonymity, and it is recommended the
practice to use different Bitcoin address for each receiving
transaction.
In Bitcoin, transactions are processed to verify their in-
tegrity, authenticity, and correctness by a group of resource-
ful network nodes called “Miners”. In particular, instead of
mining a single transaction, the miners bundle a number of
transactions that are waiting for the network to get processed
in a single unit called “block”. The miner advertises a block in
the whole network as soon as it completes its processing (or
validation) in order to claim the mining reward. This block
is then verified by the majority of miners in the network
before it is successfully added in a distributed public ledger
called “blockchain”. The miner who mines a block receives
a reward when the mined block is successfully added in the
blockchain. We now present an overview of the major techni-
cal components and operational features that are essential for
the practical realization of the Bitcoin.
A. Transaction and Proof-of-Work
Bitcoin use transactions to move coins from one user wallet
to another. In particular, the coins are represented in the form
of transactions, more specifically, a chain of transactions. As
depicted in Figure 1, the key fields in a transaction includes
Bitcoin version, hash of the transaction, Locktime1, one or
more inputs, and one or more outputs. Every input in a
transaction belongs to a particular user, and it consists of the
following: (i) hash pointer to a previous transaction which
serves as the identifier of the transaction that includes the
output we now want to utilise as an input, (ii) an index
to specific unspent previous transaction output (UTXO) that
we want to spend in the current transaction, (iii) unlocking
script length, and (iv) unlocking script (also referred to as
scriptSig) which satisfies the conditions associated with the use
of UTXO. While a transaction output consists of the number
of bitcoins that are being transferred, locking script length,
and locking script (also referred to as scriptPubKey) which
imposes a condition that must be met before the UTXO can
be spent. To authorize a transaction input, the corresponding
user of the input provides the public key and the cryptographic
signature generated using her private key. Multiple inputs are
often listed in a transaction. All of the transaction’s input
values are added up, and the total (excluding transaction fee,
if any) is completely used by the outputs of the transaction.
In particular, when the output of a previous transaction is
used as the input in a new transaction, it must be spent in
its entirety. Sometimes the coin value of the output is higher
than what the user wishes to pay. In this case, the sender
generates a new Bitcoin address, and sends the difference back
to this address. For instance, Bob has 50 coins from one of its
previous transaction’s output, and he wants to transfer 5 coins
to Alice using that output as an input in a new transaction.
For this purpose, Bob has to create a new transaction with
one input (i.e., output from its previous transaction) and two
or more outputs. In the outputs, one output will show that 5
coins are transferred to Alice, and other output(s) will show
transfer of the remaining coins to one (or more) wallet(s)
owned by Bob. With this approach, the Bitcoin achieves two
1It indicates the earliest time or blockchain length when this transaction
may be spent to the blockchain.
goals: (i) it implements the idea of change, and (ii) one can
easily identify the unspent coins or balance of a user by only
looking the outputs from its previous transactions. An output
in a transaction specifies the number of coins being transferred
along with the Bitcoin address of the new owner. These inputs
and outputs are managed using a Forth-like scripting language
which dictates the essential conditions to claim the coins. The
dominant script in today’s market is the “Pay-to-PubKeyHash”
(P2PKH) which requires only one signature from the owner
to authorize a payment. While the other script is called “Pay-
to-ScriptHash” (P2SH) [22], which is typically used as multi-
signature addresses, but it also enables a variety of transaction
types and supports future developments.
Fig. 1. Bitcoin transactions
Unlike central bank in which all the transactions are verified,
processed, and recorded in a centralized private ledger, in
Bitcoin every user acts as a bank and keep a copy of this
ledger. In Bitcoin, the role of the distributed ledger is played
by the so-called blockchain. However, storing multiple copies
of the blockchain in the network adds new vulnerabilities in
the system such as keeping the global view of the blockchain
consistent. For instance, a user (say Alice) could generate
two different transactions simultaneously using the same set
of coins to two different receivers (say, Bob and Carol).
This type of malicious behavior by a user is termed as
double spending. If both the receiver processes the transaction
independently based on their local view of the blockchain,
and the transaction verification is successful, this leaves the
blockchain into an inconsistent state. The main requirements
to avoid the above problem is two-folded: (i) distribute the
transaction verification process to ensure the correctness of
the transaction, and (ii) everyone in the network should know
quickly about a successfully processed transaction to ensure
the consistent state of the blockchain. To fulfill the aforemen-
tioned requirements, Bitcoin uses the concept of Proof-of-Work
(PoW) and a probabilistic distributed consensus protocol.
The distributed transaction verification process ensures that
a majority of miners will verify the legitimacy of a transaction
before it is added in the blockchain. In this way, whenever
the blockchain goes into an inconsistent state, all the nodes
update their local copy of blockchain with the state on which
a majority of miners agree, in this way the correct state of
the blockchain is obtained by election. However, this scheme
is vulnerable to the sybil attacks [23]. With sybil attack, a
miner creates multiple virtual nodes in the network and these
nodes could disrupt the election process by injecting false
information in the network such as voting positive for a faulty
transaction.Bitcoin counters the sybil attacks by making use of
PoW based consensus model, in which to verify a transaction
the miners have to perform some sort of computational task to
prove that they are not virtual entities. The PoW consists of a
complex cryptographic math puzzle, similar to Adam Back’s
Hashcash [24]. In particular, PoW involves scanning for a
value (called nonce) that when hashed, such as with SHA-
256, the resulting hash begins with a number of zeros. The
average work required is exponential to the number of zeros
in the correct hash however, the verification process consists of
a single step, i.e., by executing a single hash. In this way, PoW
imposes a high level of computational cost on the transaction
verification process, and the verification will be dependent on
the computing power of a miner instead of the number of
(possibly virtual) identities. The main idea is that it is much
harder to fake the computing resources than it is to perform a
sybil attack in the network.
In practice, the miners do not mine individual transactions
instead, they collect pending transactions to form a block. The
miners mine a block by calculating the hash of that block
along with a varying nonce. The nonce is varied until the
resultant hash value becomes lower or equal to a given target
value. The target is a 256-bit number that all miners share.
Calculating the desired hash value is computationally difficult.
For hashing, Bitcoin uses SHA-256 hash function [25]. Unless
the cryptographic hash function finds the required hash value,
the only option is to try different nonces until a solution (a
hash value lower than the target) is discovered. Consequently,
the difficulty of the puzzle depends on the target value, i.e.,
lower the target, the fewer solutions exist, hence more difficult
the hash calculation becomes. Once a miner calculates the
correct hash value for a block, it immediately broadcast the
block in the network along with the calculated hash value and
nonce, and it also appends the block in its private blockchain.
The rest of the miners when receiving a mined block can
quickly verify its correctness by comparing the hash value
given in the received block with the target value. The miners
will also update their local blockchain by adding the newly
mined block.
Once a block is successfully added in the blockchain (i.e.,
a majority of miners consider the block valid), the miner who
first solved the PoW will be rewarded (as of May 2017, 12.5
BTCs) with a set of newly generated coins. This reward halves
every 210,000 blocks. In particular, these mining rewards are
not really received from anyone because there is no central
authority that would be able to do this. In Bitcoin, rewards are
part of the block generation process, in which a miner inserts
a reward generating transaction (or a coinbase transaction) for
its own Bitcoin address, and it is always the first transaction
appearing in every block. If the mined block is validated and
accepted by the peers, then this inserted transaction becomes
valid and the miner receives the rewarded bitcoins.
Apart from the mining reward, for every successful addition
of a transaction in the blockchain, the miner will also receive
an amount called transaction fee, which is equivalent to the
amount remaining when the value of all outputs in a transac-
tion is subtracted from all its inputs [26]. As the mining reward
keep on decreasing with time and the number of transactions
is rapidly increasing in the network, the transaction fee takes
a major role for how fast a transaction is to be included in
the blockchain. The Bitcoin never mandates transaction fee
and it is only specified by the owner(s) of a transaction,
and it is different for each transaction. A transaction with
low transaction fee could suffer from the starvation problem,
i.e., denied service for a long time, if the miners are busy
processing the transactions with a higher transaction fee.
All the miners race to calculate the correct hash value for
a block by performing the PoW, so that they can collect the
corresponding reward. The chance of being the first to solve
the puzzle is higher for the miners who own or control more
number of computing resources. By this rule, a miner with
higher computing resources can always increase her chances
to win the reward. To enforce reasonable waiting time for the
block validation and generation, the target value is adjusted
after every 2,016 blocks. This adjustment of the target also
helps in keeping per block verification time to approximately
10 minutes. It further effects the new bitcoins generation rate
in the Bitcoin because keeping the block verification time near
to 10 minutes implies that only 12.5 new coins can be added
in the network per 10 minutes. In [27], authors propose an
equation to calculate the new target value for the Bitcoin.
The new target is given by the following Equation.
T = Tprev ∗ Tactual
2016 ∗ 10min. (1)
Here, Tprev is the old target value, and Tactual is the time
period that the Bitcoin network took to generate the last 2,016
blocks.
B. Blockchain and Mining
The blockchain is a public append-only link-list based data
structure which stores the entire network’s transaction history
in terms of blocks. In each block, the transactions are stored
using Merkle Tree [28], and a relatively secure time-stamp and
a hash of the previous block is also stored. Figure 2 shows
the working methodology that is being in use for creating and
maintaining the Bitcoin’s blockchain. To successfully add a
new block in the blockchain, the miners need to verify (mine)
a block by solving a computationally difficult PoW puzzle.
One can traverse the blockchain in order to determine the
ownership of each bitcoin because the blocks are stored in an
ordered form. Also, tempering within a block is not possible
as it would change the hash of the block. In particular, if
a transaction in a block is tampered with, the hash value
of that block changes, this, in turn, changes the subsequent
Fig. 2. Creation and addition of blocks in blockchain
Fig. 3. Blockchain consensus model
blocks because each block contains the hash of the previous
block. The blockchain constantly grows in length due to the
continuous mining process in the network. The process of
adding a new block is as follows: (i) once a miner determines
a valid hash value (i.e., a hash equal or lower than target)
for a block, it adds the block in her local blockchain and
broadcast the solution, and (ii) upon receiving a solution for
a valid block, the miners will quickly check for its validity, if
the solution is correct the miners update their local copy of
blockchain else discard the block.
Due to the distributed nature of the block validation process,
it is possible that two valid solutions are found approximately
at the same time or distribution of a verified block is delayed
due to network latency, this results in valid blockchain forks
of equal length. The forks are undesirable as the miners need
to keep a global state of the blockchain, consisting of the
totally ordered set of transactions. However, when multiple
forks exist, the miners are free to choose a fork and continue
to mine on top of it. Now that the network is having multiple
forks and miners are extending different but valid versions of
the blockchain based on their local view, a time will come
due to the random nature of PoW where miners operating on
one fork will broadcast a valid block before the others. Due
to this, a longer version of the blockchain now exists in the
network, and all the miners will start adding their following
blocks on top of this longer blockchain. The aforementioned
behavior of blockchain is shown in Figure 3.
The presence of blockchain forks in Bitcoin could be
exploited by a malicious miner to gain profits or to disturb the
normal functioning of the Bitcoin. In particular, a resourceful
miner (or mining pool) could force a blockchain fork in the
network by privately mining on it. Once the malicious miner
sees that the length of the public blockchain is catching up fast
with her private chain, the miner broadcast her blockchain in
the network, and due to its longer length, all the other miners
will start mining on top of it. In this process, all the mined (i.e.,
valid) blocks on the other parallel blockchain get discarded
which makes the efforts of the genuine miners useless. In
Section III, we will discuss an array of attacks on Bitcoin
that exploits the forking nature of Bitcoin blockchain.
In general, the security in Bitcoin is on the assumption
that the honest players control a majority of the computing
resources. The main driving factor for miners to honestly
verify a block is the reward (i.e., 12.5 BTCs) that they receive
upon every successful block addition in the blockchain. As
mentioned before that to verify a block, the miners need
to solve the associated hard crypto-puzzle. The probability
of solving the crypto-puzzle is proportional to a number
of computing resources used. As per [29], a single home
miner which uses a dedicated Application-Specific Integrated
Fig. 4. Bitcoin transaction processing steps
Circuit (ASIC) for mining will unlikely verify a single block
in years. For this reason, miners mine in the form of the
so-called mining pools. All miners that are associated with
a pool works collectively to mine a particular block under
the control of a pool manager. Upon successful mining, the
manager distributes the reward among all the associated miners
proportional to the resources expended by each miner. A
detailed discussion of different pooled mining approaches and
their reward systems is given in [30] [31].
For the better understanding how a transaction is being
processed in the Bitcoin, please refer to Figure 4. Assume
that Bob wants to transfer 5 bitcoins to Alice. In order to
pay to Alice, Bob needs a device such as a smartphone,
tablet, or laptop that runs the Bitcoin full or lightweight client-
side software, and two pieces of information which include
Bob′s private key and Alice′s Bitcoin address. Any user
in the network can send money to a Bitcoin address, but
only a unique signature generated using the private key can
release bitcoins from the account. Bob uses a cryptographic
key to digitally sign off on the transaction, proving that he
owns those coins. When Bob broadcast a transaction in the
network, an alert is sent to all the miners in the network
informing them about this new transaction. The miners check
that the digital signatures are correct, and Bob has enough
bitcoins to complete the transactions. Additionally, miners race
to bundle all the pending transactions (including bob′s) in the
network and mine the resulting block by varying the nonce.
In particular, the miners create a hash of the block, and if
the hash does not begin with a particular number of zeros,
the hash function is rerun using a new random number (i.e.,
the nonce). The required hash value must have a certain but
arbitrary number of zeros at the beginning. It is unpredictable
which nonce will generate the required hash with a correct
number of zeros, so the miners have to keep trying by using
different nonces to find the desired hash value. When the
miner finds a hash value with the correct number of zeros
(i.e., the discovered value is lower than target value), the
discovery is announced in the network, and both the Bob and
the Alice will also receive a confirmation about the successful
transaction. Other miners communicate their acceptance, and
they turn their attention to discover the next block in the
network. However, a successful transaction could be discarded
or deemed invalid at latter period of time, if it is unable to
stay in the blockchain due to reasons, such as existence of
multiple forks, majority of miners does not agree to consider
the block containing this transaction as a valid block, a double
spending attack is detected, to name a few.
The Bitcoin protocol rewards the winning miner with the
set of newly minted bitcoins as incentive, and the hashed
block is published in the public ledger. Once Bob′s transaction
has been added in the blockchain, he and Alice each receive
the first confirmation stating that the Bitcoin has been signed
over to Alice. In terms of transaction time, it depends on the
current network load and the transaction fee included in the
transaction by Bob, but at the minimum, it would be around
10 minutes. However, receiving the first confirmation does
not mean that the transaction is processed successfully, and it
cannot be invalidated at a latter point in time. In particular,
it has been recommended by the Bitcoin community that
after a block is mined it should receive enough consecutive
block confirmations (currently 6 confirmations) before it is
considered as a valid transaction.
C. Consensus Protocol
Bitcoin blockchain is a decentralized system, thus it does
not require authorization from any trusted third party (TTP)
to process the transactions. In particular, the nodes com-
municate over a network and collaboratively construct the
blockchain without relying on a central authority. However,
individual nodes might crash, behave maliciously, act against
the common goal, or the network communication may become
interrupted. For delivering a continuous service, the nodes,
therefore, run a fault-tolerant consensus protocol to ensure that
they all agree on the order in which entries are appended to
the blockchain. To add a new block in the blockchain, every
miner must follow a set of rules specified in the consensus
protocol. Bitcoin achieves the distributed consensus by using
PoW based consensus algorithm. This algorithm imposes the
following major rules: (i) input and output values are rational,
(ii) transactions only spend unspent outputs, (iii) all inputs
being spent have valid signatures, (iv) no coinbase2 transaction
outputs were spent within 100 blocks of their creation, and (v)
no transactions spend inputs with a locktime before the block
in which they are confirmed. Generally, a blockchain based
system such as Bitcoin is considered as secure and robust as
its consensus model.
In the PoW based consensus algorithm, the participants
require no authentication to join the network, which makes
the Bitcoin consensus model extremely scalable in terms
of supporting thousands of network nodes. However, PoW
based consensus is vulnerable to “51%” attacks, in which
an adversary has control over 51% of the mining power (i.e.
hashrate) in the network, hence it can write its own blocks
or fork the blockchain that at a later point converges with
the main blockchain. This behavior of adversary helps her to
perform several other types of attacks in the Bitcoin, which
includes double spending, eclipse, and denial-of-service. In
particular, 51% attack drives away the honest miners from the
mining process, thus weakens the consensus protocol which
poses a threat to Bitcoin security and robustness. One way to
achieve the 51% attack in Bitcoin system is to incentivize (or
bribe) the honest miners to join the attackers’ coalition.
Along with the various security attacks (please refer to
tables I and II), the effectiveness of a consensus protocol also
depends on the performance and stability of the network. For
instance, an increase in the latency between the validation
of a block and its receipt by all other miners increases the
possibility of a temporary blockchain fork. Although, due to
the PoW model eventual consistency in the blockchain will
be reached despite the temporary forks however, it results
in longer transaction confirmation times. Today the Bitcoin
network is restricted to a sustained rate of 7 transactions
per section (tps) due to the Bitcoin protocol restricting block
sizes to 1MB. This is very slow when considered the high
processing speed of MasterCard or VISAs, i.e., millions of
tps. Therefore, it is important for Bitcoin to have a broadcast
network which is not only decentralized but it also provides
low latency, and it is difficult to deliberately censor or delay
messages. The PoW based consensus algorithm also wastes
a lot of energy in hash computations during the mining
process. However, it facilitates high scalability in terms of
nodes participating in the network and operates completely in
a decentralized fashion.
Bitcoin consensus algorithm has been its most widely
debated component in the Bitcoin research community. This is
because the consensus algorithm rises: (i) open questions about
the Bitcoin stability [10]; (ii) concerns about the performance
and scalability of the protocol [32]; and (iii) concerns for
2A coinbase transaction is a unique type of bitcoin transaction that can only
be created by a miner.
computational resource wastage [33]. In particular, the PoW
consensus model used by Bitcoin blockchain is very inefficient
in terms of power consumption and the overall generation
time of new blocks. Hence, to overcome or limit some
of the aforementioned disadvantages of PoW, various other
consensus protocols such as Proof-of-Stake (PoS) [34], Proof
of Elapsed Time (PoET), Proof of Authority (PoA), Practical
byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [35], Federated Byzantine
Fault Tolerance (FBFT), Proof of Storage [36] [37], to name
a few are designed. The most obvious difference between
these consensus protocols and PoW is that each of these
alternative protocols the consensus is driven at the expense
of internal resources (e.g., coins or reputation) instead of
external resources (e.g., electricity). This creates an entirely
different set of incentives for (and trust in) network nodes (i.e.,
miners), which drastically changes the network security model.
Detailed discussions on these alternative consensus protocols
are out of the scope of our survey, hence we direct interested
users to [38] [20] [39] [40] [41].
D. Networking Infrastructure
Bitcoin uses an unstructured peer-to-peer (P2P) network
based on unencrypted persistent TCP connections as its foun-
dational communication structure. In general, unstructured
overlays are easily constructed and robust against highly
dynamic network topologies, i.e., against frequently joining
and leaving peers. These type of networks are best suited
for Bitcoin as the aim is to distribute information as fast
as possible to reach consensus on the blockchain. However,
experimenting with the Bitcoin network/protocol poses a chal-
lenge. By now, there are a few possibilities to approach this
task. One way is to connect to the mainnet, i.e., the live Bitcoin
network, or the testnet. Another way is to use the simulation
environments such as Shadow [42] event discrete simulator,
which aims at simulating large-scale Bitcoin networks, while
keeping full control over all components.
Bitcoin nodes maintain a list of IP addresses of potential
peers, and the list is bootstrapped via a DNS server, and addi-
tional addresses are exchanged between peers. Each peer aims
to maintain a minimum of 8 unencrypted TCP connections in
the overlay, i.e, the peer actively tries to establish additional
connections if the current number of connections is lower
than 8. The number of eight connections can be significantly
exceeded if incoming connections are accepted by a Bitcoin
peer upto a maximum of 125 connections at a time. By default,
peers listen on port 8333 for inbound connections. When peers
establish a new connection, they perform an application layer
handshake, consisting of version and verack messages. The
messages include a timestamp for time synchronization, IP
addresses, and the protocol version. A node selects its peers
in a random fashion and it selects a new set of peers after a
fixed amount of time. This is done to minimize the possibility
and effects of netsplit attack, in which an attacker creates an
inconsistent view of the network (and the blockchain) at the
attacked node. Since Bitcoin version 0.7, IPv6 is supported. In
order to detect when peers have left, Bitcoin uses a softstate
approach. If 30 minutes have been passed since messages were
last exchanged between neighbors, peers will transmit a hello
message to keep the connection alive.
Miners continually listen to new block announcements
which are sent via INV messages containing the hash of
the mined block. If a miner discovers that it does not hold a
newly announced block, it transmits a GETDATA message
to one of its neighbor. The neighbor then respond by sending
the requested information in a BLOCK message. In case
the requested block do not arrive within 20 minutes, the
miner trigger the disconnection of that particular neighbor
and request the same information from another neighbor. The
propagation of transactions occur in a sequence given as INV ,
GETDATA, and TX messages, in which nodes announce,
request, and share transactions that have not yet been included
in the blockchain.
In order to form the distributed consensus, newly discovered
transactions and blocks are propagated (through flooding) in
the whole network. Miners store new transactions for the
mining purposes, but after some time remove them if they do
not make it on the blockchain. It is the responsibility of the
transaction originator that the transaction is received by all the
peers in the network. To this end, the originator might need to
rebroadcast the transaction if it did not get into the blockchain
in first attempt. This is to ensure that the transaction gets
considered in the next block. An adversary could introduce
delay in the propagation of both, new transactions and mined
block, for the purpose of launching the double spend and
netsplit attacks. As shown in [43], the propagation time can
even be further extended under reasonable circumstances.
Authors in [5] presents a taxonomy of routing attacks and
their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks,
targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting
the network as a whole. By isolating parts of the network or
delaying block propagation, adversaries could cause significant
amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue
losses and exposing the network to a wide range of exploits
such as double spending.
The use of an unstructured P2P network in Bitcoin enables
the required rapid distribution of information in every part
of the network. The security of Bitcoin heavily depends on
the global consistent state of blockchain which relies on the
efficiency of its PoW based consensus protocol. The variations
in the propagation mechanisms could adversely affect the
consensus protocol. The presence of inconsistent blockchain
states, if exploited correctly could lead to a successful double
spending. To this end, it is essential that the Bitcoin network
should remains scalable in terms of network bandwidth, net-
work size, and storage requirements because this will facilitate
the increase in number of honest miners in the network, which
will strengthen the consensus protocol. In Bitcoin, full nodes
download and verify all blocks starting from the genesis block
because it is the most secure way. Full nodes participate in
the P2P network and help to propagate information, although
its not mandatory to do so. Alternatively, the thin clients use
the simplified payment verification (SPV) to perform Bitcoin
transactions. The SPV is a method used by Bitcoin thin client
for verifying if particular transactions are included in a block
without downloading the entire block. However, the use of
SPV costs the thin clients because it introduces weaknesses
such as Denial of Service (DoS) and privacy leakage for
the thin client. In particular, the general scalability issues of
unstructured overlays combined with the issues induced by
the Bitcoin protocol itself remains in the system. Many of the
results suggest that scalability remains an open problem [44]
and it is hard to keep the fully decentralized network in
future [45] [46].
E. Benefits and Challenges
Same as any other emerging technology, use of Bitcoin
comes with certain benefits and challenges, and various types
of risks are associated with its use. It is believed3 that Bitcoin
has the following benefits and challenges.
Benefits -
• No Third-Party Seizure: No central authority can manip-
ulate or seize the currency since every currency transfer
happens peer-to-peer just like hard cash. In particular, bit-
coins are yours and only yours, and the central authority
cant take your cryptocurrency, because it does not print
it, own it, and control it correspondingly.
• Anonymity and transparency: Unless Bitcoin users pub-
licize their wallet addresses publicly, it is extremely hard
to trace transactions back to them. However, even if the
wallet addresses was publicized, a new wallet address
can be easily generated. This greatly increases privacy
when compared to traditional currency systems, where
third parties potentially have access to personal financial
data. Moreover, this high anonymity is achieved without
sacrificing the system transparency as all the bitcoin
transactions are documented in a public ledger.
• No taxes and lower transaction fees: Due to its decen-
tralized nature and user anonymity, there is no viable
way to implement a Bitcoin taxation system. In the past,
Bitcoin provided instant transactions at nearly no cost.
Even now, Bitcoin has lower transaction costs than a
credit card, Paypal, and bank transfers. However, the
lower transaction fee is only beneficial in situations where
the user performs a large value international transactions.
This is because the average transaction fee becomes
higher for very small value transfers or purchases such
as paying for regular household commodities.
• Theft resistance: Stealing of bitcoins is not possible until
the adversary have the private keys (usually kept offline)
that are associated with the user wallet. In particular, Bit-
coin provides security by design, for instance, unlike with
credit cards you dont expose your secret (private key)
whenever you make a transaction. Moreover, bitcoins
are free from Charge-backs, i.e., once bitcoins are sent,
the transaction cannot be reversed. Since the ownership
address of the sent bitcoins will be changed to the new
owner, and it is impossible to revert. This ensures that
there is no risk involved when receiving bitcoins.
3As some of these benefits and challenges are not entirely true at all the
times, for instance, Bitcoin transactions are not fully anonymous and the
privacy of Bitcoin users could be threatened.
Challenges:
• High energy consumption: Bitcoin’s blockchain uses
PoW model to achieve distributed consensus in the
network. Although, the use of PoW makes the mining
process more resistant to various security threats such
as sybil and double spending, it consumes a ridicu-
lous amount of energy and computing resources [47].
In particular, processing a bitcoin transaction consumes
more than 5000 times as much energy as using a Visa
credit card, hence innovative technologies that reduce this
energy consumption are required to ensure a sustainable
future for Bitcoin. Furthermore, due to the continuous
increase in network load and energy consumption, the
time required for transaction processing is increasing.
• Wallets can be lost: Since there is no trusted third party
if a uses lost the private key associated with her wallet
due to a hard drive crash or a virus corrupts data or lost
the device carrying the key, all the bitcoins in the wallet
has been considered lost for forever. There is nothing
that can be done to recover the bitcoins, and these will
be forever orphaned in the system. This can bankrupt a
wealthy Bitcoin investor within seconds.
• (Facilitate) Criminal activity: The considerable amount
of anonymity provided by the Bitcoin system helps the
would-be cyber criminals to perform various illicit activ-
ities such as ransomware [48], tax evasion, underground
market, and money laundering.
According to [49], the risk is the exposure to the level of
danger associated with Bitcoin technology; in fact, the same
can be applied to any such digital cryptocurrency. The major
risks that threaten the wide usability of the Bitcoin payment
systems are as follow.
• Social risks: it includes bubble formation (i.e., risk of
socio-economic relationship such as what people talk and
gossip), cool factor (i.e., entering the networking without
knowing the ill effects), construction of chain (i.e., risk
related with the blockchain formation like hashing and
mining rewards), and new coins release (i.e., on what
basis the new coins to be generated, is there a need etc.).
• Legal risks: Bitcoin technology opposes rules and regula-
tions, and hence it finds opposition from the government.
This risk also includes law enforcement towards handling
financial, operational, customer protection and security
breaches that arise due to Bitcoin system.
• Economic risks: deflation, volatility and timing issues in
finding a block which might lead the users to migrate
towards other currencies that offer faster services.
• Technological risks: this includes the following, net-
work equipment, and its loss, network with which the
peers are connected and its associated parameters, threat
vulnerabilities on the system, hash functions with its
associated robustness factor, and software associated risks
that Bitcoin system demands.
• Security risks: security is a major issue in Bitcoin system,
we will discuss risks associated due to various security
threats in detail in Section III.
In [50], authors perform a survey on the people’s opinion
about bitcoins usage. Participants argue that the greatest barrier
to the usage of bitcoins is the lack of support by higher
authorities (i.e., government). Participants felt that bitcoins
must be accepted as legitimate and reputable currency. Ad-
ditionally, the participants expressed that the system must
provide support towards transacting fearlessly without criminal
exploitation. Furthermore, the Bitcoin is mainly dependent on
the socio-technical actors, and the impact of their opinion on
the public. Few among participants have suggested that the
blockchain construction is the major cause of disruption due
to its tendency to get manipulated by adversaries.
In [51], it was stated that many Bitcoin users already lost
their money due to poor usability of key management and
security breaches, such as malicious exchanges and wallets.
Around 22.5% of the participants reported having lost their
bitcoins due to security breaches. Also, many participants
stated that for a fast flow of bitcoins in the user community,
simple and impressive user interface are even more important
than security. In addition, participants highlighted that the poor
usability and lack of knowledge regarding the Bitcoin usage
are the major contributors to the security failures.
III. SECURITY: ATTACKS ON BITCOIN SYSTEMS
Bitcoin is the most popular cryptocurrency4 and has stood
first in the market capital investment from day one. Since it
is a decentralized model with an uncontrollable environment,
hackers and thieves find cryptocurrency system an easy way
to fraud the transactions. In this section, we discuss existing
security threats and their countermeasures for Bitcoin and
its underlying technologies. We provide a detailed discussion
of potential vulnerabilities that can be found in the Bitcoin
protocols as well as in the Bitcoin network, this will be
done by taking a close look at the broad attack vector and
their impact on the particular components in the Bitcoin.
Apart from double spending, which is and will always be
possible in Bitcoin, the attack space includes a range of wallet
attacks (i.e., client-side security), network attacks (such as
DDoS, sybil, and eclipse) and mining attacks (such as 50%,
block withholding, and bribery). Tables I and II provides a
comprehensive overview of the potential security threats along
with their impacts on various entities in Bitcoin and their
possible solutions that exist in literature so far.
A. Double Spending
A client in the Bitcoin network achieves a double spend
(i.e., send two conflicting transactions in rapid succession) if
she is able to simultaneously spend the same set of bitcoins
in two different transactions [2]. For instance, a dishonest
client (Cd) creates a transaction TCdV at time t using a set
of bitcoins (Bc) with a recipient address of a vendor (V ) to
purchase some product from V . Cd broadcast TCdV in the
Bitcoin network. At time t′ where t′ ≈ t, Cd create and
broadcast another transaction TCdCd using the same coins (i.e.,
Bc) with the recipient address of Cd or a wallet which is
under the control of Cd. In the above scenario, the double
4www.cryptocoinsnews.com/
TABLE I
MAJOR ATTACKS ON BITCOIN SYSTEM AND ITS POW BASED CONSENSUS PROTOCOL
Attack Description Primary targets Adverse effects Possible countermeasures
Double spending or Race
attack [2] spent the same bitcoinsin multiple transactions,
send two conflicting trans-
actions in rapid succession
sellers or mer-
chants
sellers lose their
products, drive away the
honest users, create
blockchain forks
inserting observers in network [2],
communicating double spending
alerts among peers [2], nearby
peers should notify the merchant
about an ongoing double spend as
soon as possible [52], merchants
should disable the direct incoming
connections [53] [54]
Finney attack [55] dishonest miner broad-
casts a pre-mined block
for the purpose of dou-
ble spending as soon as
it receives product from a
merchant
sellers or mer-
chants
facilitates double
spending wait for multi-confirmations fortransactions
Brute force attack [56] privately mining on
blockchain fork to
perform double spending
sellers or mer-
chants
facilitates double
spending, creates large
size blockchain forks
inserting observers in the net-
work [2], notify the merchant about
an ongoing double spend [53]
Vector 76 or
one-confirmation
attack [57]
combination of the double
spending and the finney
attack
Bitcoin exchange
services
facilitates double
spending of larger
number of bitcoins
wait for multi-confirmations for
transactions
> 50% hashpower or
Goldfinger [45] adversary controls morethan > 50% Hashrate
Bitcoin network,
miners, Bitcoin
exchange centers,
and users
drive away the miners
working alone or within
small mining pools,
weakens consensus
protocol, DoS
inserting observers in the
network [2], communicating
double spending alerts among
peers [2], disincentivize
large mining pools [58] [59],
TwinsCoin [60], PieceWork [61]
Block
discarding [62] [54] or
Selfish mining [6]
abuses Bitcoin forking
feature to derive an unfair
reward
honest miners (or
mining pools)
introduce race conditions
by forking, waste the
computational power of
honest miners, with
> 50% it leads to
Goldfinger attack
ZeroBlock technique [63] [64],
timestamp based techniques
such as freshness preferred [65],
DECOR+ protocol [66]
Block
withholding [29] [67] miner in a pool sub-mits only PPoWs, but not
FPoWs
honest miners (or
mining pools)
waste resources of fellow
miners and decreases the
pool revenue
include only known and trusted
miners in pool, dissolve and close
a pool when revenue drops from
expected [62], cryptographic com-
mitment schemes [67]
fork after withholding
(FAW) attack [68] improves on adverse ef-fects of selfish mining and
block withholding attack
honest miners (or
mining pools)
waste resources of fellow
miners and decreases the
pool revenue
no practical defense reported so far
spending attack performed by Cd is successful, if Cd tricks
the V to accept TCdV (i.e., V deliver the purchased products
to Cd) but V will not be able to redeem subsequently. In
Bitcoin, the network of miners verify and process all the
transactions, and they ensure that only the unspent coins
that are specified in previous transaction outputs can be used
as input for a follow-up transaction. This rule is enforced
dynamically at run-time to protect against the possible double
spending in the network. The distributed time-stamping and
PoW-based consensus protocol is used for orderly storage of
the transactions in the blockchain. For example, when a miner
receives TCdV and T
Cd
Cd
transactions, it will be able to identify
that both the transactions are trying to use the same inputs
during the transaction propagation and mining, thus it only
process one of the transaction and reject the other. Figure 5
shows the working methodology of a double spending attack
depicting the above explanation.
Despite the use of strict ordering of transactions in the
blockchain, PoW scheme, distributed time-stamping [69], and
consensus protocol [70] [71], double spending is still possible
in Bitcoin. To perform a successful double spending attack,
following requirements need to be fulfilled: (i) part of the
network miners accept the transaction TCdV and the vendor
(V ) receives the confirmation from these miners, thus releases
the product to dishonest client (Cd), (ii) at the same time, other
part of the network miners accept the transaction TCdCd , hence
Fig. 5. Double Spending Attack
lead to blockchain forks in the network, (iii) the vendor re-
ceives the confirmation of transaction TCdCd after accepting the
transaction TCdV , thus losses the product, and (iv) a majority
of miners mine on top of the blockchain which contains TCdCd
as a valid transaction. If the aforementioned steps took place
in the given order then the dishonest client is able to perform
a successful double spend. In the rest of this section, we will
discuss the variants of double spending attack that are used in
order to realize the aforementioned double spend requirements
with varying difficulties and complexities.
A form of double spending called Finney attack [55], here
a dishonest client (Cd) pre-mines (i.e., privately) a block
which contains the transaction TCdCd , and then it creates a
transaction TCdV using the same bitcoins for a vendor (V ).
The mined block is not informed to the network, and the Cd
waits until the transaction TCdV is accepted by the V . On the
other hand, V only accept TCdV when it receives a confirmation
from miners indicating that TCdV is valid and included in the
existing blockchain. Once Cd receives the product from V , the
attacker releases the pre-mined block into the network, thus
creates a blockchain fork (say B′fork) of equal length to the
existing fork (say Bfork). Now, if the next mined block in the
network extends B′fork blockchain instead of Bfork, then as
per the Bitcoin protocol rules all the miners in the network
will build on top of B′fork. As the blockchain B
′
fork becomes
the longest chain in the network, all the miners ignore Bfork,
hence the top block on Bfork which contains the transaction
TCdV becomes invalid. This makes the transaction T
Cd
V invalid,
the client will get back her coins through transaction TCdCd ,
but resulting the V losing the product. However, with Finney
attack an adversary can only perform double spending in the
presence of one-confirmation vendors.
To avoid the Finney attack, the vendor should wait for
multiple confirmations before releasing the product to the
client. The waiting for multiple confirmations will only make
the double spend for the attacker harder, but the possibility
of the double spend remains. An advancement of the Finney
attack is called Brute-force attack [56] in which a resourceful
attacker has control over n nodes in the network, and these
nodes collectively work on a private mining scheme with
the motive of double spend. An attacker introduces a double
spend transaction in a block as in the previous case, while
continuously works on the extension of a private blockchain
(i.e., B′fork). Suppose a vendor waits for x confirmations
before accepting a transaction, and it sends the product to the
client once it receives the x confirmations. Later, the attacker
is able to mine the x number of blocks ahead (i.e., privately)
then she can release these blocks in the network, and due
to its higher length than Bfork, blockchain B′fork will be
extended by all the miners in the network. This causes the
same after effects as Finney attack, thus causing a successful
double spending attack.
Another attack that uses the privately mined block to
perform a new form of double spending attack on Bitcoin ex-
change networks is popularly known as Vector 76 attack [57].
A Bitcoin exchange is a digital marketplace where traders
can buy, sell or exchange bitcoins for other assets, such as
fiat currencies or altcoins. In this, a dishonest client (Cd)
withholds a pre-mined block which consists of a transaction
that implements a specific deposit (i.e., deposit coins in a
Bitcoin exchange). The attacker (Cd) waits for the next block
announcement and quickly sends the pre-mined block along
with the recently mined block directly to the Bitcoin exchange
or towards its nearby peers with hope that the exchange
and probably some of the nearby miners will consider the
blockchain containing the pre-mined block (i..e, B′fork) as the
main chain. The attacker quickly sends another transaction that
requests a withdrawal from the exchange of the same coins that
was deposited by the attacker in its previous transaction. At
this point of time, if the other fork (i.e., Bfork) which does not
contain the transaction that is used by the attacker to deposit
the coins survives, the deposit will become invalidated but the
attacker has already performed a withdrawal by now, thus the
exchanges losses the coins.
Recently, authors in [72] proposes a new attack against
the PoW-based consensus mechanism in Bitcoin called the
Balance attack. The attack consists of delaying network
communications between multiple subgroups of miners with
balanced hash power. The theoretical analysis provides the
precise trade-off between the Bitcoin network communication
delay and the mining power of the attacker(s) needed to double
spend in Ethereum [73] with high probability.
Based on the above discussion on double spending attack
and its variants, one main point that emerges is that if a
miner (or mining pool) is able to mine blocks with a faster
rate than the rest of the Bitcoin network, the possibility of
a successful double spending attack is high. The rate of
mining a block depends upon solving the associated proof-
of-work, this again depends on the computing power of a
miner. Apart from the computing resources, the success of
double spending attack depends on other factors as well
which includes network propagation delay, vendor, client, and
Bitcoin exchange services connectivity or positioning in the
Bitcoin network, and the number of honest miners. Clearly,
as the number of confirmations for transaction increases, the
possibility that it will become invalid at a later stage decreases,
thus decreases the possibility of a double spend. On the other
hand, with the increase in the computing resources of a miner,
the probability of the success of a double spend increases. This
leads to a variant of double spend attack called > 50% attack
or Goldfinger attack [45] in which more than 50% computing
resources of the network are under the control of a single miner
(or mining pool). The > 50% attack is considered the worst-
case scenario in the Bitcoin network because it has the power
to destroy the stability of the whole network by introducing the
actions such as claim all the block intensives, perform double
spending, reject or include transactions as preferred, and play
with the Bitcoin exchange rates. The instability in the network
once started, it will further strengths the attacker’s position as
more and more honest miners will start leaving the network.
From the above discussion on the different type of double
spending attacks, we can safely conclude that one can always
perform a double spend or it is not possible to entirely
eliminate the risk of double spending in Bitcoin. However,
performing double spending comes with a certain level of
risk, for instance, the attacker might lose the reward for
the withheld block if it is not included in the final public
blockchain. Therefore, it is necessary to set a lower bound on
the number of double spend bitcoins, and this number should
compensate the risk of unsuccessful attempts of double spend.
Additionally, the double spends could be recognized with the
careful analysis and traversing of the blockchain, thus it might
lead to blacklisting the detected peer. In Section IV-A, we will
discuss in detail, the existing solutions and their effectiveness
for detecting and preventing the double spending attacks.
B. Mining Pool Attacks
Mining pools are created in order to increase the computing
power which directly affects the verification time of a block,
hence it increases the chances of winning the mining reward.
For this purpose, in recent years, a large number of mining
pools have been created, and the research in the field of
miner strategies is also evolved. Generally, mining pools are
governed by pool managers which forwards unsolved work
units to pool members (i.e., miners). The miners generate par-
tial proofs-of-work (PPoWs) and full proofs-of-work (FPoWs),
and submit them to the manager as shares. Once a miner
discovers a new block, it is submitted to the manager along
with the FPoW. The manager broadcasts the block in the
Bitcoin network in order to receive the mining reward. The
manager distributes the reward to participating miners based
on the fraction of shares contributed when compared with the
other miners in the pool. Thus, participants are rewarded based
on PPoWs, which have absolutely no value in the Bitcoin
system. The Bitcoin network currently consists of solo miners,
open pools that allow any miner to join, and closed (private)
pools that require a private relationship to join.
In recent years, the attack vector that exploits the vulnerabil-
ities in pool based mining also increases. For instance, a group
of dishonest miners could perform a set of internal and external
attacks on a mining pool. Internal attacks are those in which
miners act maliciously within the pool to collect more than
their fair share of collective reward or disrupt the functionality
of the pool to distant it from the successful mining attempts. In
external attacks, miners could use their higher hash power to
perform attacks such as double spending. Figure 6 shows the
market share till December 2017 of the most popular mining
pools. In this section, we will discuss a set of popular internal
and external attacks on the mining pools.
Fig. 6. Bitcoin Hashrate Distribution in Present Market
In a mining pool, the pool manager determines the amount
of work done by individual pool members, by using the
number of shares, a member find and submit while trying
to discover a new block. The shares consist of a number of
hashes of a block which are low enough to have discovered
a block if the difficulty was 1. To be considered as a share,
each hash has a probability of 1/232. Assuming correctness of
the hash function used, it is impossible to find shares without
doing the work required to discover new blocks or to look
for blocks without finding shares along the way. Due to this,
the number of shares determined by a miner is proportional,
on average, to the number of hashes the miner calculated
while attempting to discover a new block for the mining pool.
Additionally, in [29], the author discusses the possibility of
using variable block rewards and difficulty shares as reward
methods in a pool. This variability is introduced due to the
following reasons; bitcoins generation per block is cut in half
every 210000 blocks, and the transaction fees vary rapidly
based on the currently available transactions in the network. As
most of the mining pools allow any miner to join them using a
public Internet interface, such pools are susceptible to various
security threats. The adversaries believe that it is profitable to
cannibalize pools than mine honestly. Let’s understand it with
an example, suppose that an adversary has 30% of hashrate
(HR) and 1 BTC is the block mining reward (MR). If the
mining pool is sharing the reward based on the invested HR
then the adversary will receive 0.3 BTC for each mined block.
Now adversary purchases more mining equipment, worth 1%
of current HR. With standard mining strategy, the adversary
will gain an additional revenue of 0.0069 BTC for the 1%
added HR. By performing pool cannibalizing (i.e., distribute
your 1% equally among all other pools, and also withhold
the valid blocks) the attacker will still receive the rewards
from its pool, but it might also receive additional rewards
from the other pools to which she is sharing its 1% HR.
This misbehavior will remain undetectable unless the change
in reward is statistically significant.
Fig. 7. Selfish Mining
In [62], authors use a game theoretic approach to show that
the miners could have a specific sort of subversive mining
strategy called selfish mining [6] or also popularly known as
block discarding attack [54] [62]. In truth, all the miners in
the Bitcoin are selfish as they are mining for the reward that
is associated with each block, but these miners are also honest
and fair with respect to the rest of miners, while the selfish
mining here refers to the malicious miners only. In the selfish
mining, the dishonest miner(s) perform information hiding
(i.e., withhold a mined block) as well as perform its revealing
in a very selective way with a two-fold motive: (i) obtain an
unfair reward which is bigger than their share of computing
power spent, and (ii) confuse other miners and lead them to
waste their resources in a wrong direction. As it can be seen in
Figure 7 that by keeping the mined block(s), the selfish miners
intentionally fork the blockchain. The selfish pool keeps on
mining on top of their private chain (B′fork), while the honest
miners are mining on the public chain (Bfork). If the selfish
miners are able to take a greater lead on B′fork and they are
able to keep the lead for a longer time period, their chances
of gaining more reward coins as well as the wastage of honest
miners resources increases. To avoid any losses, as soon as
the Bfork reaches to the length of B′fork, the selfish miners
publish their mined blocks. All the miners need to adopt to
B′fork which now becomes Bfork as per the longest length
rule of Bitcoin protocol. The honest miners will lose their
rewards for the blocks that they have mined and added to the
previous public chain. The analysis in [6] shows that using
the selfish mining, the pool’s reward exceed its share of the
network’s mining power. The statement still holds in cases
where the network found their new block before the adversary
could find a new second block. Because in such case the miner
will make use of the race to propagate, i.e., on average the
attacker manages to tell 50% of the network about her block
first. Additionally, the analysis reveals that the wastage of
computing resources and rewards lure honest miners toward
the selfish mining pools, hence it further strengthens the attack.
This continuous increase in the selfish pool’s size might lead
to > 50% attack, and at that point, the effect of selfish mining
will be disastrous.
Another attack much similar to the selfish mining that could
be performed on a mining pool is known as Block withholding
(BWH) [29] [67], in which a pool member never publishes a
mined block in order to sabotage the pool revenue however,
submit shares consists of PPoWs, but not FPoWs. In particular,
in [29], two types of block withholding scenarios are presented
called “Sabotage” and “Lie in wait”. In the first scenario, the
adversary does not gain any bitcoins, but it just makes other
pool members lose, while in the second scenario, the adversary
performs a complex block concealing attack similar to the one
described in the selfish mining attack. In [29], authors discuss
a generalized version of the “Sabotage” attack which shows
that with slight modification, it is possible for the malicious
miner to also earn an additional profit in this scenario. Authors
in [33] present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing effects
of block withholding attack on mining pools. The analysis
shows that the attack is always well-incentivized in the long-
run, but may not be so for a short duration. This implies
that existing pool protocols are insecure, and if the attack is
conducted systematically, Bitcoin pools could lose millions of
dollars worth in just a few months.
To analyze the effects of BWH on mining pools, authors
in [9] presents The Miners Dilemma, which uses an iterative
game to model attack decisions. The game is played between
two pools, say pool A and pool B, and each iteration of the
game is a case of the Prisoners Dilemma, i.e., choose between
attacking or not attacking. If pool A chooses to attack pool A,
pool A gains revenue, pool A loses revenue, but pool B can
latter retaliate by attacking pool A and gaining more revenue.
Thus, attacking is the dominant strategy in each iteration,
hence if both pool A and pool B attack each other, they will be
at a Nash Equilibrium. This implies that if both will earn less
than they would have if neither of them attacked. However, if
none of the other pools attack, a pool can increase its revenue
by attacking the others. Recently, authors in [68] propose a
novel attack called a fork after withholding (FAW) attack.
Authors show that the BWH attackers reward is the lower
bound of the FAW attackers, and it is usable up to four times
more often per pool than in BWH attack. Moreover, the extra
reward for a FAW attack when operating on multiple mining
pools is around 56% higher than BWH attack. Furthermore,
the miners dilemma may not hold under certain circumstances,
e.g., when two pools execute FAW attack, the larger pool can
consistently win. More importantly, unlike selfish mining, an
FAW attack is more practical to execute while using intentional
forks.
The Pool Hopping attack presented in [29] [74] uses the
information about the number of submitted shares in the
mining pool to perform the selfish mining. In this attack,
the adversary performs continuous analysis of the number of
shares submitted by fellow miners to the pool manager in order
to discover a new block. The idea is that if already a large
number of shares have been submitted and no new block has
been found so far, the adversary will be getting a very small
share from the reward because it will be distributed based on
the shares submitted. Therefore, at some point in time, it might
be more profitable for the adversary to switch to another pool
or mine independently.
Recently, the Bribery attack is described in [75]. In this,
an attacker might obtain the majority of computing resources
for a short duration via bribery. Authors discuss three ways to
introduce bribery in the network: (i) Out-of-Band Payment,
in which the adversary pays directly to the owner of the
computing resources and these owners then mine blocks
assigned by the adversary, (ii) Negative-Fee Mining Pool, in
which the attacker forms a pool by paying higher return,
and (iii) In-Band Payment via Forking, in which the attacker
attempts to bribe through Bitcoin itself by creating a fork
containing bribe money freely available to any miner adopting
the fork. By having the majority of the hash power, the attacker
could launch different attacks such as double spending and
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) [76]. The miners that
took the bribes will get benefits which will be short-lived, but
these short-lived benefits might be undermined by the losses
in the long run due to the presence of DDoS and Goldfinger
attacks or via an exchange rate crash.
Fig. 8. Blacklisting via Punitive Forking
An adversary with > 50% hashrate could perform a suc-
cessful selective blacklisting via punitive forking. The objec-
tive of punitive forking is to censor the Bitcoin addresses
owned by certain people, say Alice, and prevent them from
spending any of their bitcoins. The strategy to perform the
blacklisting (please refer to Figure 8) is as follows: (i) the
adversary with > 50% network hashrate announces to the
Bitcion network that she will not extend on the blockchain
containing transactions spending from Alice’s Bitcoin address,
(ii) if some other miner include a transaction from Alice in
a block, the adversary will fork and create a longer proof
of work blockchain, (iii) Block containing Alice’s transaction
now invalidated, and it can never be published, also the miner
who added the block with Alice’s transaction will lose its block
reward. However, a weak adversary that has lower hashrate can
still cause delays and inconveniences for Alice’s transaction.
Punitive forking doesn’t work unless you have > 50% of
hashrate. However, there is another strategy to achieve the
blacklisting as presented in [77]. In particular, authors present
a malicious mining strategy called feather forking, in which
an attacker announces that she will attempt to fork if she sees
a block containing Alice’s transaction in the blockchain, but
she will give up after a while. This is the adversary forks as
per its convenience, she will continue to extend its fork until
wins (i.e., outraces the main chain), but she gives up (i.e.,
discard its private fork and continue to extend the main chain)
after block with Alice’s transaction contains k confirmations.
An adversary with total hash power less than 50% might, with
high probability, lose rewards, but it will be able to block the
blacklisted transaction with positive probability. Moreover, if
the adversary can show that she is determined to block the
selected transaction and will perform the retaliatory forking if
required, then the rest of the miners will also be motivated to
block the blacklisted transactions to avoid the losses, in case, if
the attacker retaliates and wins. If this is the case, an attacker
might be able to enforce the selective blacklisting with no
real cost because other miners are convinced that the attacker
will perform a costly feather forking attack if provoked. An
attacker performing feather forking can also use it to blackmail
a client by threatening that all her transactions will be put on
the blacklist until the client pays the asked ransom coins.
C. Client-side Security Threats
The huge increase in the popularity of bitcoins encouraged a
large number of new users to join the network. Each Bitcoin
client posses a set of private-public keys in order to access
its account or wallet. Hence, it is desirable to have the key
management techniques that are secure, yet usable. This is due
to the fact that unlike many other applications of cryptography
if the keys of a client are lost or compromised, the client will
suffer immediate and irrevocable monetary losses. To use the
bitcoins, a user needs to install a wallet on her desktop or
mobile device. The wallet stores the set of private-public keys
associated with the owner of the wallet, thus it is essential to
take protective actions to secure the wallet. The wallet thefts
are mainly performed using mechanisms that include system
hacking, installation of buggy software, and incorrect usage of
the wallet.
Bitcoin protocol relies heavily on elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy [98] for securing the transactions. In particular, Bitcoin
uses elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) which
is standardized by NIST [99] for signing the transactions.
For instance, consider the standard “Pay-to-PubKeyHash”
(P2PKH) transaction script in which the user needs to provide
her public key and the signature (using her private key) to
prove the ownership. To generate a signature, the user chooses
a per-signature random value. For security reason, this value
must be kept secret, and it should be different for every other
transaction. Repeating per-signature value risks the private
key computation, as it has been shown in [100] that even
partially bit-wise equal random values suffice to derive a user’s
private key. Therefore, it is essential for increasing the security
of ECDSA to use highly random and distinct per-signature
values for every transaction signature. The inspection of the
blockchain for instances, in which the same public key uses
the same signature nonces for multiple times has been reported
by the authors in [101]. In particular, the authors report that
there are 158 public keys which have reused the signature
nonce in more than one transaction signature, thus making it
possible to derive user’s private key. Recently, authors in [102]
present a systematic analysis of the effects of broken primitives
on Bitcoin. Authors highlight the fact that in the current
Bitcoin system has no migration plans in-place for both the
broken hash and the broken signature scheme, i.e., the Bitcoins
TABLE II
MISBEHAVIOR ATTACKS TARGETING BITCOIN NETWORK AND ENTITIES
Attack Description Primary targets Adverse effects Possible countermeasures
Bribery attacks [75] adversary bribe miners to
mine on her behalf
miners and mer-
chants
increases probability of a
double spend or block
withholding
increase the rewards for honest
miners, make aware the miners to
the long-term losses of bribery [75]
Refund attacks [78] adversary exploits the re-
fund policies of existing
payment processors
sellers or mer-
chants, users
merchant losses money
while honest users might
lose their reputation
publicly verifiable evidence [78]
Punitive and Feather
forking [77] [79] dishonest miners blacklisttransactions of specific ad-
dress
users freeze the bitcoins of userfor forever remains an open challenge
Transaction
malleability [80] [4] adversary change theTXID without invalidating
the transaction
Bitcoin exchange
centers
exchanges loss funds due
to increase in double
deposit or double
withdrawal instances
multiple metrics for transaction
verification [81], malleability-
resilient “refund” transaction [80]
Wallet theft [21] adversary stole or destroy
private key of users
individual users
or businesses
bitcoins in the wallet are
lost threshold signature basedtwo-factor security [82] [83],
hardware wallets [84], TrustZone-
backed Bitcoin wallet [85],
Password-Protected Secret Sharing
(PPSS) [86]
Time jacking [87] adversary speed-up the
majority of miner’s clock
miners
isolate a miner and waste
its resources, influence
the mining difficulty
calculation process
constraint tolerance ranges [87],
network time protocol (NTP) or
time sampling on the values re-
ceived from trusted peers [88]
DDoS [89] [90] a collaborative attack to
exhaust network resources
Bitcoin network,
businesses, min-
ers, and users
deny services to honest
users/miners, isolate or
drive away the miners
Proof-of-Activity (PoA)
protocol [91], fast verification
signature based authentication
Sybil [23] adversary creates multiple
virtual identities
Bitcoin network,
miners, users
facilitates time jacking,
DDoS, and double
spending attacks,
threatens user privacy
Xim (a two-party mixing proto-
col) [92]
Eclipse or netsplit [3] adversary monopolizes all
incoming and outgoing
connections of victim
miners, users
inconsistent view of the
network and blockchain,
enable double spends
with more than one
confirmation
use whitelists, disabling incoming
connections [3]
Tampering [43] delay the propagation of
transactions and blocks to
specific nodes
miners, users
mount DoS attacks,
wrongfully increase
mining advantage, double
spend
improve block request management
system [43]
Routing attacks [5] isolate a set of nodes from
the Bitcoin network, de-
laying block propagation
miners, users
denial of service attack,
increases possibility of
0-confirmation double
spends, increases fork
rate, waste the mining
power of the pools
increase the diversity of node con-
nections, monitor round-trip time,
use gateways in different ASes [5]
Deanonymization [93] [94] linking IP addresses with
a Bitcoin wallet
users user privacy violation mixing services [95],
CoinJoin [96], CoinShuffle [97]
RIPEMD160, SHA256, and ECDSA techniques are vulnerable
to various security threats such as collision attacks [103].
The authors in [102] found that the main vectors of attack
on bitcoins involve collisions on the main hash or attacking
the signature scheme, which directly enables coin stealing.
However, a break of the address hash has minimal impact, as
addresses do not meaningfully protect the privacy of a user.
Unlike most of the online payment systems that rely on
login details consisting of the password and other confidential
details for user authentication, Bitcoin relies on public key
cryptography. This raises the issues of the secure storage and
management of the user keys. Over the years, various type
of wallet implementations are researched to obtain secure
storage of the user keys, it includes software, online or hosted,
hardware or offline, paper and brain wallets. Table III shows a
number of popular wallets and their main features. Coinbase
(coinbase.com), an online wallet is most popular due to its
desirable features which it provides to the clients that include:
(i) a web interface using which the wallet can be assessed
with a browser and Internet connection, (ii) a mobile app
that allows access to wallet through mobile devices, (iii) an
access to Coinbase do not require a client software and it is
independent in nature due to which the wallet providers does
not have any control over the funds stored in a client’s wallet,
and (iv) a moderate level of security and privacy. The Copay
wallet allows multiple users to be associated with the same
wallet, while the Armory wallet works in online as well as in
offline mode. The wallet providers have to find an adequate
trade-off between usability and security while introducing a
new wallet into the market. For instance, an online wallet is
more susceptible to thefts compared to hardware wallets [84]
as later are not connected to the Internet, but at the same time
hardware wallets lacks usability. If done right, there exist more
advanced and secure ways to store the user keys called paper
and brain wallets. As their name indicates, in the paper wallet
the keys are written on a document which is stored at some
physical location analogizes the cash money storage system,
while in brain wallet the keys are stored in the clients mind in
the form of a small passphrase. The passphrase if memorized
correctly is then used to generate the correct private key.
To avoid the aforementioned risks such as managing cryp-
tographic keys [104], lost or stolen devices, equipment failure,
Bitcoin-specific malware [105], to name a few, that are asso-
ciated while storing the bitcoins in a wallet, many users might
prefer to keep their coins with online exchanges. However,
storing the holdings with an exchange makes the users vulner-
able to the exchange systems. For instance, one of the most
notorious events in the Bitcoin history is the breakdown and
ongoing bankruptcy of the oldest and largest exchange called
Mt. Gox, which lost over 450 millions of dollars. Moreover,
a few other exchanges have lost their customers bitcoins
and declared bankruptcy due to external or internal theft, or
technical mistakes [106]. Although, the vulnerability of an
exchange system to the disastrous losses can never be fully
avoided or mitigated, therefore the authors in [107] presents
Provisions, which is a privacy-preserving proof of solvency
for Bitcoin exchanges. Provision is a sensible safeguard that
requires the periodic demonstrations from the exchanges to
show that they control enough bitcoins to settle all of its
customers accounts.
D. Bitcoin Network Attacks
In this section, we will discuss those attacks in the Bitcoin
that exploits the existing vulnerabilities in the implementation
and design of the Bitcoin protocols and its peer-to-peer com-
munication networking protocols. We will start our discussion
with the most common networking attack called Distributed
Denial-of-Service (DDoS) which targets Bitcoin currency ex-
changes, mining pools, eWallets, and other financial services
in Bitcoin. Due to the distributed nature of Bitcoin network
and its consensus protocol, launching a DoS attack has no
or minimal adverse effect on network functionalities, hence
attackers have to lunch a powerful DDoS to disturb the net-
working tasks. Unlike DoS attack, in which a single attacker
carried out the attack, in DDoS, multiple attackers launch
the attack simultaneously. DDoS attacks are inexpensive to
carry out, yet quite disruptive in nature. Malicious miners can
perform a DDoS (by having access to a distributed Botnet) on
competing miners, effectively taking the competing miners out
of the network and increasing the malicious miners effective
hashrate. In these attacks, the adversary exhausts the network
resources in order to disrupt their access to genuine users. For
example, an honest miner is congested with the requests (such
as fake transactions) from a large number of clients acting
under the control of an adversary. After a while, the miner
will likely to start discarding all the incoming inputs/requests
including requests from honest clients. In [89], authors provide
a comprehensive empirical analysis of DDoS attacks in the
Bitcoin by documenting the following main facts: 142 unique
DDoS attacks on 40 Bitcoin services and 7% of all known
operators were victims of these attacks. The paper also states
that the majority of DDoS attack targets the exchange services
and large mining pools because a successful attack on these
will earn huge revenue for the adversary as compared to
attacking an individual or small mining pools.
In [90], authors explore the trade-off between the two min-
ing pool related strategies using a series of game-theoretical
models. The first strategy called construction, in which a
mining pool invests in increasing its mining capacity in order
to increase the likelihood of winning the next race. While in
the second strategy called destruction, in which the mining
pool launches a costly DDoS attack to lower the expected
success rate of the competing mining pools. The majority of
the DDoS attacks target large organizations due to bulk ransom
motives. Companies like CoinWallet and BitQuick were forced
to shut down only after few months of their launch due to
the effects of continuous DDoS attacks. As stated above that
DDoS attack take various forms, one of which is to discourage
a miner so that it will withdraw itself from the mining process.
For instance, an attacker displays to a colleague miner that it is
more powerful, and it can snatch the reward of mining, and it
is the obvious winner of the mining process. An honest miner
backoffs since its chances of winning is less. In this way, an
adversary will be successful in removing individual miners as
well as small pools from the mining network, thus imposing a
TABLE III
BITCOIN WALLETS
Coinbase Blockchain TREZOR Exodus MyCelium Bitcoin
Core
MultiBit
HD
Electrum Copay Armory
Wallet type Hot wallet Hot wallet Hardware
wallet
Hot wallet Hot wallet Hot wallet Hot wallet Hot wallet Multisig Varies
Web interface Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No
Mobile app Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No
Desktop client No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Independent
wallet No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Privacy Moderate Weak Variable Good Good Good Moderate Good Good Good
Security Good Good Good Good Good Good Good Moderate Good Good/Moderate
DDoS attack on the network [90]. Moreover, in [108], authors
propose network partitioning in Bitcoin, hence isolating the
honest nodes from the network by reducing their reputation.
Now we discuss the so-called Malleability attacks [4],
which also facilitates the DDoS attacks in Bitcoin. For in-
stance, by using a Malleability attack an adversary clogs the
transaction queue [109]. This queue consists of all the pending
transactions which are about to be serviced in the network.
Meanwhile, an adversary puts in bogus transactions with the
high priority depicting itself to be highest incentive payer for
the miners. When the miners try to verify these transactions,
they will find that these are the false transaction, and but by
this time they have already spent a considerable amount of
time in verifying these false transactions. This attack wastes
the time and resources of the miners and the network [110].
Malleability is defined in terms of cryptography by [4]. A
cryptographic primitive is considered malleable, if its output
Y can be “mauled” to some “similar” value Y ′ by an adversary
who is unaware of the cryptographic secrets that were used to
develop Y .
In [80], another form of malleability attack called trans-
action malleability is introduced. Suppose that a transaction
TnA→B which transfers n bitcoins from A
′s wallet to B′s
wallet. With transaction malleability it is possible to create
another T ′ that is syntactically different (i.e., TnA→B and T
′
has different transaction hash ID T idx ) from T
n
A→B , although
semantically it is identical (i.e. T ′ also transfers n coins
from wallet A to B). An adversary can perform transaction
malleability without even knowing the private key of A. On
a high level, transaction malleability refers to a bug in the
original Bitcoin protocol which allows the aforementioned
behavior in the network possible. The main reason of the
success of this attack is that, in Bitcoin each transaction is
uniquely identified by its T idx , hence in some cases T
′ will be
considered a different transaction than TnA→B .
In Bitcoin, certainly, the transaction malleability is not
desirable, but it does not cause any damage to the system until
an adversary exploits its behavior and make someone believe
that a transaction has been failed. However, after a while, the
same transaction gets published in the global blockchain. This
might lead to a possible double spend, but it is particularly
more relevant while targeting the Bitcoin exchanges which
holds a significant amount of coins. This is because it allows
the users to buy and sell bitcoins in exchange for cash
money or altcoins. The Bitcoins reference implementation is
immune to the transaction malleability because it uses previous
transaction’s outputs as an indication for the successfully
issued transactions. However, few exchanges use a custom
implementation and were apparently vulnerable. For instance,
Mt. Gox (a popular exchange) issued a statement in the early
days of Bitcoin that they were attacked due to transaction
malleability, therefore they are forced to halt withdrawals and
freezing clients account. The attack that MtGox claimed to
be the victim proceeds as follows: (i) an dishonest client
Cd deposits n coins in his MtGox account, (ii) Cd sends a
transaction T to MtGox asking to transfer her n coins back,
(iii) MtGox issues a transaction T ′ which transfers n coins to
Cd, (iv) Cd performs the malleability attack, obtaining T ′ that
is semantically equivalent to T but has a different T idx , now
assume that T ′ gets included into the blockchain instead of
T , (v) Cd complains to MtGox that the transaction T was not
successful, (vi) MtGox performs an internal check, and it will
not found a successful transaction with the T idx , thus MtGox
credits the money back to the user’s wallet. Hence effectively
Cd is able to withdraw her coins twice. The whole problem
is in the above Step (vi), where MtGox should have searched
not for the transaction with T idx of T , but for any transaction
semantically equivalent to T .
For the first time, authors in [5] present the impact of routing
attacks on Bitcoin network by considering both small and
large scale attacks. The paper shows that two key properties of
Bitcoin networks which includes, the ease of routing manipu-
lation, and the rapidly increasing centralization of Bitcoin in
terms of mining power and routing, makes the routing attacks
practical. More specifically, the key observations suggest that
any adversary with few (< 100) hijacked BGP prefixes could
partition nearly 50% of the mining power, even when consid-
ering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. The research
also shows that attackers on acting as intermediate nodes
can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering
with few key Bitcoin messages. Authors back their claims
by demonstrating the feasibility of each attack against the
deployed Bitcoin software, and quantify their effect on the
current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin
supernode combined with BGP routing data. Furthermore, to
prevent the effect of aforementioned attacks in practice, both
short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be
deployed immediately are suggested.
Due to the vulnerabilities that exist in the refund policies
of the current Bitcoin payment protocol, a malicious user
can perform the so-called Refund attacks. In [78], authors
present the successful implementation of the refund attacks
on BIP70 payment protocol. BIP70 is a Bitcoin community-
accepted standard payment protocol that governs how vendors
and customers perform payments in Bitcoin. Most of the major
wallets use BIP70 for bitcoins exchange, and the two dominant
Payment Processors called Coinbase and BitPay, who uses
BIP70 and collectively they provide the infrastructure for
accepting bitcoins as a form of payment to more than 100,000
vendors. The authors propose two types of refund attacks
called Silkroad Trader attack which highlights an authenti-
cation vulnerability in the BIP70, and Marketplace Trader
attack which exploits the refund policies of existing payment
processors. The brief description of both these refund attacks
is as follows.
• In Silkroad attack, a customer is under the control of
an ill trader. When a customer starts trading with the
merchant its address is revealed to the ill trader. When the
transaction is finished, the adversary initiates the attack
by inserting the customers’ address as the refund address
and send a refund request to the merchant. The merchant
sends the amount to the ill merchant, thus gets cheated
without receiving a refund from the other side. During
this whole process of refund between the merchant and
the ill trader, the customer is not at all aware of the fraud
that is happening in her name.
• The Marketplace trader attack is a typical case of the
man-in-the-middle attack. In this, the adversary setup
an attractive webpage where she attracts the customer
who falls victim in the later stages. The attacker depicts
herself as a trusted party by making payments through
trust-able merchants like CeX. When a customer clicks
the webpage, accidentally reveals her address among the
other identities that are sufficient to perform malpractice
by the rogue trader with the false webpage. When cus-
tomer purchase products, a payment page is sent which
is a legitimate payment exchange merchant. The end
merchant is connected to the adversary’s webpage and
meanwhile, the details of the customer would have been
already revealed to the attacker through an external email
communication according to the Bitcoin refund policies.
After the transaction, the middle adversary claims a
refund on behalf of the customer and the refund amount
will be sent to the rogue adversary’s account. Hence, the
legitimate customer will not be aware of the fraud process
but the merchant loses his bitcoins [78].
Later, both these attacks have been acknowledged by Coinbase
and Bitpay with temporary mitigation measures put in place.
However, the authors claim that to fully address the identified
issues will require revising the BIP70 standard.
Yet another attack on the Bitcoin networks is called Time
jacking attack [87]. In Bitcoin network, all the participating
nodes internally maintain a time counter that represents the
network time. The value of the time counter is based on
the median time of a node’s peers, and it is sent in the
version message when peers first connect. However, if the
median time differs by more than 70 minutes from the system
time, the network time counter reverts to the system time.
An adversary could plant multiple fake peers in the network
and all these peers will report inaccurate timestamps, hence
it can potentially slow down or speed up a node’s network
time counter. An advanced form of this attack would involve
speeding up the clocks of a majority of the miners while
slowing down the target’s clock. Since the time value can be
skewed by at most 70 minutes, the difference between the
nodes time would be 140 minutes [87]. Furthermore, by an-
nouncing inaccurate timestamps, an attacker can alter a node’s
network time counter and deceive it into accepting an alternate
blockchain because the creation of new blocks heavily depends
on network time counters. This attack significantly increases
the possibility of the following misbehaviors: a successful
double spending attack, exhaust computational resources of
miners, and slow down the transaction confirmation rate.
Fig. 9. Eclipse attack
Apart from the aforementioned major attacks on Bitcoin
protocol and network, there are few other minor attacks that
we have summarized below.
• Sybil Attack: A type of attack where attacker installs
dummy helper nodes and tries to compromise a part of
the Bitcoin network. A sybil attack [23] is a collaborative
attack performed by a group of compromised nodes. Also,
an attacker may change its identity and may launch a
collusion attack with the helper nodes. An attacker tries
to isolate the user and disconnect the transactions initiated
by the user or a user will be made to choose only those
blocks that are governed by the attacker. If no nodes in
the network confirm a transaction that input can be used
for double spending attack. An intruder with her helper
nodes can perform a collaborated timing attack, hence
it can hamper a low latency encryption associated with
the network. The other version of this attack where the
attacker tries to track back the nodes and wallets involved
in the transaction is discussed in [92].
• Eclipse attack: In this attack [3], an adversary manip-
ulates a victim peer, and it force network partition (as
shown in Figure 9) between the public network and a
specific miner (victim). The IP addresses to which the
victim user connects are blocked or diverted towards an
adversary [3]. In addition, an attacker can hold multiple
IP addresses to spoof the victims from the network. An
attacker may deploy helpers and launch other attacks on
the network such as N−confirmation double spending
and selfish mining. The attack could be of two type: (i)
Infrastructure attacks, where attack is on the ISP (Inter-
net Service Provider) which holds numerous contiguous
addresses, hence it can manipulate multiple addresses
that connect peer-to-peer in the network, and (ii) botnet
attacks, where an adversary can manipulate addresses in
a particular range, especially in small companies which
own their private set of IP addresses. In both the cases,
an adversary can manipulate the peers in the Bitcoin
network.
• Tampering: In a Bitcoin network, after mining a block
the miners broadcast the information about newly mined
blocks. New transactions will be broadcast from time
to time in the network. The network assumes that the
messages will reach to the other nodes in the network
with a good speed. However, authors in [43] ground this
assumption and proved that the adversary can induce
delays in the broadcast packets by introducing congestion
in the network or making a victim node busy by sending
requests to all its ports. Such type of tampering can
become a root cause for other types of attacks in the
network.
E. Practical attack incidents on Bitcoin
In this section, we briefly present the existing real-world
security breaches/incidents that have affected adversely to
Bitcoin and its associated technologies, such as blockchain
and PoW based consensus protocol. From the start, bitcoin
fans occasionally mentioned about different security, typically
discussing things like the 51% attack, quantum computer
strikes, or an extreme denial of service onslaught from some
central bank or government entity. However, these days the
word attack is used a bit more loosely than ever, as the scaling
debate has made people believe almost everything is a Bitcoin
network invasion.
One of the biggest attacks in the history of Bitcoin have
targeted Mt. Gox, the largest Bitcoin exchange, in which a
year’s long hacking effort to get into Mt. Gox culminated
in the loss of 744,408 bitcoins. However, the legitimacy of
attack was not completely confirmed, but it was enough to
make Mt. Gox to shut down and the value of bitcoins to
slide to a three-month low. In 2013, another attack called Silk
Road, the worlds largest online anonymous market famous
for its wide collection of illicit drugs and its use of Tor and
Bitcoin to protect its user’s privacy, reports that it is currently
being subjected to what may be the most powerful distributed
denial-of-service attack against the site to date. In the official
statement from the company the following was stated, “The
initial investigations indicate that a vendor exploited a recently
discovered vulnerability in the Bitcoin protocol known as
transaction malleability to repeatedly withdraw coins from our
system until it was completely empty”. Although transaction
malleability is now being addressed by segwit, the loss it
caused was far too small with the main issue seemingly being
at a human level, rather than protocol level. In the same year,
Sheep Marketplace, one of the leading anonymous websites
also announces that they have been hacked by an anonymous
vendor EBOOK101 who stole 5400 bitcoins. However, in all
the aforementioned, it remains unclear that whether there is
any hacked happened or it is just a fraud by the owners to
stole the bitcoins.
Bitstamp, an alternative to MT Gox, increasing its market-
share while Gox went under were hacked out of around 5
million dollars in 2015. The theft seems to have been a
sophisticated attack, with phishing emails targeting bitstamps
personnel. However, as the theft was limited to just hot wallets,
they were able to fully cover it, leading to no direct customer
losses. Poloniex is one of the biggest altcoin exchange with
trading volumes of 100,000 BTC or more per day, lost their
12.3% of bitcoins in March 2014. The hack was executed
by just clicking withdrawal more than once. As it can be
concluded from the above discussion that the attackers always
target the popular exchanges to increase their profit. However,
it does not implies that individual users are not targeted, it’s
just that the small attacks go unnoticed. Recently, in August
2016, BitFinex, which a popular cryptocurrency exchange
suffered a hack due to their wallet vulnerability, and as a result
around 120000 bitcoins were stolen.
From the nature of the aforementioned attacks, it can
be concluded that security is a vital concern and biggest
weakness for cryptocurrency marketplaces and exchanges. In
particular, as the number of bitcoins stored and their value
has skyrocketed over the last year, bitcoins digital wallets
have increasingly become a target for hackers. At the social
level, what is obvious and does not need mentioning (although
some, amazingly, dispute it) is that individuals who handle our
bitcoins should be public figures with their full background on
display for otherwise they cannot be held accountable. Lacking
such accountability, hundreds of millions, understandably, is
far too tempting as we have often seen. An equally important
point is that bitcoin security is very hard. Exchanges, in
particular, require highly experienced developers who are
fully familiar with the bitcoin protocol, the many aspects
of exchange coding and how to secure hard digital assets
for, to truly secure bitcoin, exchanges need layers and layers
amounting to metaphorical armed guards defending iron gates
with vaults deep underground behind a thousand doors.
IV. SECURITY: COUNTERMEASURES FOR BITCOIN
ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss the state-of-the-art security
solutions that provides possible countermeasures for the array
of attacks (please refer to Section III) on Bitcoin and its
underlying technologies.
A. No more double spending
The transaction propagation and mining processes in Bitcoin
provide an inherently high level of protection against double
spending. This is achieved by enforcing a simple rule that only
unspent outputs from the previous transaction may be used in
the input of a next transaction, and the order of transactions
is specified by their chronological order in the blockchain
which is enforced using strong cryptography techniques. This
boils down to a distributed consensus algorithm and time-
stamping. In particular, the default solution that provides
resistance to double spending in Bitcoin is its use of Proof-
of-work (PoW) based consensus algorithm, which limits the
capabilities of an adversary in terms of, the computational
resources available to an adversary and the percentage of
honest miners in the network. More specifically, the purpose
of the PoW is to reach consensus in the network regarding the
blockchain history, thereby synchronizing the transactions or
blocks and making the users secure against double-spending
attacks. Moreover, the concept of PoW protect the network
against being vulnerable to sybil attack because a successful
sybil attack could sabotage the functionality of consensus
algorithm and leads to possible double spending attack.
In general, double spending could be dealt in two possibles
ways: (i) detect a double spending instance by monitoring the
blockchain progress, and once detected, identify the adversary
and take adequate actions, or (ii) use preventive measures.
The former approach works well in the traditional centralized
online banking system, but in Bitcoin, it’s not suitable due
to the use of continuously varying Bitcoin address, thus it
provides anonymity to users, and the lack of transaction roll-
back scheme once it is successfully added in the blockchain.
Therefore, the latter approach, i.e., prevent double spend is
desirable in Bitcoin.
The most effective yet simple way to prevent a double spend
is to wait for a multiple numbers of confirmations before
delivering goods or services to the payee. In particular, the pos-
sibility of a successful double spend decreases with increase
in the number of confirmations received. Of course, the longer
back transactions lie in the blockchain, the more blocks need
to be caught up until a malicious chain gets accepted in the
network. This limits attacker from possible revise the history
of transactions in the chain. For instance, unconfirmed bitcoin
transaction (zero block transaction) has a high risk of double
spend, while a transaction with atleast one confirmation has
statically zero risks of double spend, and a transaction with six
confirmations are commonly considered steady, hence has zero
risks of double spend. In Bitcoin, the classic bitcoin client will
show a transaction as not unconfirmed until the transaction
is six blocks deep5 in the blockchain. However, waiting of
six transactions (about one hour) might not be suitable for
various applications such as fast payment systems, e.g., Alice
is very hungry and she wants to buy a snack with bitcoins.
There is nothing special about the choice of the default safe
confirmation value, i.e., six confirmations. Its choice is based
on the assumption that an adversary is unlikely to control more
than 10% of the mining power, and that a negligible risk lower
than 0.1% is acceptable. This means that on one hand, the six
confirmations are overkill for casual attackers, while at the
same time it is powerless against more dedicated attackers
with much more than 10% mining power.
Authors in [2] evaluate three techniques that can be used
to detect a possible double spending in fast payment systems.
The three techniques are as follow: listening period, inserting
observers, and forwarding double spending attempts. In the
first technique, the vendor associates a listening period with
5Each new block that will be put on top of a block containing the desired
transaction will result in the generation of a confirmation for the desired
transaction.
each received transaction, and it monitors all the receiving
transactions during this period. The vendor only delivers the
product, if it does not see any attempt of double spending
during its listening period. The inserting observers technique
naturally extends the first technique based on the adoption of a
listening period would be for the vendor to insert a set of nodes
(i.e., “observers”) under its control within the Bitcoin network.
These observers will directly relay all the transactions to the
vendor that they receive from the network. In this way, with the
help of the observers, the vendor is able to see more number
of transactions in the network during its listening period, thus
increases the chances of detecting a double spend. The third
technique (i.e., forwarding double spending attempts) requires
each Bitcoin peer to forward all transactions that attempt to
double spend instead of discarding them so that the vendor can
receive such a transactions on time (i.e., before releasing the
product). With this approach, whenever a peer receives a new
transaction, it checks whether the transaction is an attempt to
double spend, if so then peer forward the transaction to their
neighbors (without adding it to their memory pools).
Recently, the hash power of a pool called GHash.IO
reached 54% for a day (i.e., it exceeds the theoretical attack
threshold of 51%). Although the GHash.IO remained honest
by transferring a part of its mining power to other pools.
However, the incentives that motivate an adversary to create
large pools remains in the network, always looking for a
chance to wrongful gain and disrupt the network. Therefore,
a method to prevent the formation of large pools called Two
phase Proof-of-Work (2P-PoW) has been proposed in [59].
The authors propose a second proof-of-work (say Y ) on top
of the traditional proof-of-work (say X) of the block header.
Y signs the produced header with the private key controlling
the payout address. Similar to existing hashing procedures this
signature must meet a target set by the network, hence the use
of Y forces pool managers to distribute their private key to
their clients if the manager wants to retain the same level of
decentralization. However, if a manager would naively share
its private key, all clients would be authorized to move funds
from the payout address to any destination. Pool managers
unwilling to share their private key needs to install mining
equipment required to solve Y in a timely manner. It is
estimated that GHash.IO owns only a small percentage of the
network’s computing power in terms of hardware, as the pool
shrank significantly after public outrage. Depending on the
difficulty of Y ′s cryptographic puzzle this would only allow
a certain number of untrusted individuals to join. In this way,
as GHash.IO is a public pool, severely limit its size.
Authors in [111] propose the use of decentralized non-
equivocation contracts, to detect the double spending and pe-
nalize the malicious payer. The basic idea of non-equivocation
contracts is that the payer locks some bitcoins in a deposit
when he initiates a transaction with the payee. If the payer
double spends, a cryptographic primitive called accountable
assertions can be used to reveal his Bitcoin credentials for
the deposit. Thus, the malicious payer could be penalized by
the loss of deposit coins. However, such decentralized non-
equivocation contracts are subjected to collusion attacks where
the payer colludes with the beneficiary of the deposit and
transfers the Bitcoin deposit back to himself when he double
spends, resulting in no penalties. On the other hand, even if the
beneficiary behaves honestly, the victim payee cannot get any
compensation directly from the deposit in the original design.
To prevent such collusion attacks, authors in [112] design fair
deposits for Bitcoin transactions to defend against double-
spending. The fair deposits ensure that the payer will be
penalized by the loss of his deposit coins if he double spends
and the victim payees loss will be compensated. The proposed
protocol uses the assertion scheme from [111]. In particular,
the beneficiary can recover the payers secret key if the payer
double spends. However, to ensure that the payees loss can
be compensated if the payer double spends, in addition to
a signature generated with the payers secret key, a signature
generated with the payees secret key is required for the release
of the compensation locked in the deposit. Meanwhile, the
incentive for the beneficiary is also guaranteed in the deposit.
Another solution to control double spending was proposed
in [113] where all the participating users deposit a safety
amount similar to an agreement. If an attacker tries to double
spend and it is detected, the deposit amount will be deducted
and it is given to the victim who encountered the loss. Due
to the punishing attribute of the network, the attack can be
controlled. In [54], authors suggest a countermeasure by pro-
hibiting the merchant to accept incoming connections, thus an
adversary cannot directly send a transaction to the merchant.
This forces the adversary to broadcast the transaction over the
Bitcoin network, and this ensures that the transaction will end
up in the local view of all the miners that forwards it. Later
if the adversary tries to double spend the miners will know
about it and take primitive actions in future.
Solution for 50% attack is presented in [54]. The authors
provide countermeasures for two variants of 50% attack
namely: block discarding attack and difficulty rising attack.
In block discarding attack, an adversary has control over a set
of nodes in the network, called supporters. The adversary and
her supporters purposefully add a delay in the propagation of
the legitimately discovered blocks, and the attacker advertises
her block selfishly. Hence, the advertiser’s blockchain will in-
crease, and the other blocks due to delay get less attention. The
delay becomes worse as the number of supporter increases.
The solution for this attack is fixing the punishment for the
advertisers or the misbehaving miners. Every node is asked
to pay a deposit amount, and the nodes who misbehave are
punished by dissolving the deposit amount of the concerned.
This amount is distributed among the nodes who informs about
the misbehaving node in the network. While in difficulty rising
attack, the attacker manipulates the network and slowly raises
the difficulty level for the miners. An attacker poses a threat
to the network by controlling high hash-power compared with
other nodes in the network. The solution to this attack is same
as that of block discarding attack. In [114], authors propose a
method called “proof-of-reputation”, where the honest miners
will get a token based on the current market value. The number
of tokens issued can vary with the market value. If the miner
has the token, he will be reputed in the mining market pool.
The token has a value, and according to which the coins are
deposited from all the miners from time to time and is fixed by
the network. More the reputation of the miner’s chain, more
the other blocks merge with that chain.
For now, it is safe to conclude that there is no solution avail-
able in the literature that guarantees the complete protection
from double spending in Bitcoin. The existing solutions only
make the attack more difficult for adversaries. In particular,
double spending is an attack that is well discussed in the
Bitcoin community, but very few solutions exist so far, and
it remains an open challenge for the researchers. The easiest,
yet most powerful way for a vendor to avoid a double spend is
to wait for more number of confirmations before accepting a
transaction. Therefore, each vendor or merchant of the deals in
bitcoins has to set a trade-off between the risk and the product
delivery time caused while waiting for an appropriate number
of confirmations. Similar to the honest Bitcoin users, there is
also a trade-off for the adversary as she needs to consider the
expenses (i.e., the loss of computing resources and rewards
for the pre-mined blocks) if the attack fails.
B. Countermeasures for Private Forking and Pool Attacks
When a dishonest miner intentionally forks the blockchain
by privately mining a set of blocks, it makes the Bitcoin
network vulnerable to a wide range of attacks such as selfish
mining, block-discarding attack, block withholding attack,
bribery attack, to name a few. The aim of these attacks is
to cheat the mining incentive system of Bitcoin. Therefore,
at any point in time, detecting and mitigating the faulty forks
from the set of available forks poses a major challenge for
Bitcoin protocol developers. The simplest solution to handle
the selfish mining is suggested in [6]. The authors propose a
simple, backward-compatible change to the Bitcoin protocol.
In particular, when a miner encounters the presence of multiple
forks of the same length, it will forward this information to all
its peers, and it randomly chooses one fork to extend. Hence,
each miner implementing the above approach by selecting a
random fork to extend. This approach will decrease the selfish
pool’s ability to increase the probability that other miners will
extend their fork.
To further extend the countermeasure presented in [6],
authors in [65] introduce the concept of Freshness Preferred
(FP), which places the unforgeable timestamps in blocks and
prefer blocks with recent timestamps. This approach uses
Random Beacons [115] in order to stop miners from using
timestamps from the future. As the selfish mining uses strate-
gic block withholding technique, the proposed strategy will
decrease the incentives for selfish mining because withheld
blocks will lose block races against newly minted or fresh
blocks. A similar but a more robust solution for selfish
mining that requires no changes in existing Bitcoin protocol is
proposed in [63]. The authors suggest a fork-resolving policy
that selectively neglects blocks that are not published in time,
and it appreciates blocks that include a pointer to competing
blocks of their predecessors. Therefore, if the secretly mined
block is not published in the network until a competing block
is published, it will contribute to neither or both branches,
hence it will not get benefits in winning the fork race. Authors
in [116] proposes another defense against selfish mining, in
which miners need to publish intermediate blocks (or in-
blocks). These blocks, although are valid with lower puzzle
difficulty, but confer no mining reward onto the miner who
discovers one. When a fork happens, miners adopt the branch
with the largest total amount of work, rather than the longest
chain.
Unlike most of the aforementioned solutions against ma-
licious forking, authors in [64] propose a timestamp-free
prevention of block withholding attack called ZeroBlock. In
ZeroBlock, if a selfish miner keeps a mined block private
more than a specified interval called mat, than later when
this block is published on the network, it will be rejected
by the honest miners. The key idea is that each consecutive
block must be published in the network, and it should be
received by honest miners within a predefined maximum
acceptable time for receiving a new block (i.e., mat interval).
In particular, an honest miner either receives or publishes the
next block in the network within the mat interval. Otherwise,
to prevent the block withholding, the miner itself generates a
specific dummy block called Zeroblock. These signed dummy
Zeroblocks will accompany the solved blocks to prove, that the
block is witnessed by the network and that a competing block
is absent before miners are able to work on it. For forking
attacks that are internal to a pool, authors in [62] suggest that
the only viable option to countermeasure a block withholding
attack launched within a pool is that the pool managers should
involve ONLY miners which are personally known to them,
hence they can be trusted. The pool manager should simply
dissolve and close a pool as soon as the earning of the pool
goes lower than expected from its computational effort.
In [75], bribery attack is discussed along with its coun-
termeasure. In bribery, an attacker bribe a miner to rent
her computing resources, thus it increases the attackers hash
power that it could use to launch various attacks in the
network. As a countermeasure, authors suggest the use of
anti-payment (i.e, counter-bribing) to pool miners which have
value more than what attackers are paying to these miners
to perform a malicious behavior. However, the drawback is
that a legitimate pool manager has to spend a lot to take
miners toward the normal mining routine. In addition, as the
number of bribing node or a node’s bribe amount increases,
the capital requirements for the manager also increases, and
as the crypt math becomes more and more difficult the bribe
amount increases, hence makes it difficult for the manager to
keep the process of counter-bribing active for longer periods.
C. Securing Bitcoin wallets
A wallet contains private keys, one for each account [104].
These private keys are encrypted using the master key which
is a random key, and it is encrypted using AES-256-CBC
with a key derived from a passphrase using SHA-512 and
OpenSSLs EVP BytesToKey [117]. Private key combined
with the public key generates a digital signature which is used
to transact from peer-to-peer. Bitcoin uses ECDSA (Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) algorithm for encryption,
and it is modified in [101] for secret sharing and threshold
cryptography.
A manual method of wallet protection was proposed
by [118] called “cold wallet”. A cold wallet is another account
that holds the excess of an amount by the user. This method
uses two computers (the second computer has to be discon-
nected from the Internet) and using the Bitcoin wallet software
a new private key is generated. The excess amount is sent to
this new wallet using the private key of a user. Authors in [118]
claim that if the computer is not connected to the Internet, the
hackers will not get to know the keys, hence the wallet safety
can be achieved. Securing wallets with new cryptographic
algorithms apart from ECDSA is still an open issue and a
challenge. In [119], an article states that US government have
launched their own Bitcoin networks with multi-factor security
which incorporates fingerprint biometrics for wallet protection.
A device is a standalone tool same as the size of a credit
card. In [84], authors propose BlueWallet, a proof-of-concept
based hardware token for the authorization of transactions
in order to protect the private keys. The concept is similar
to the use of the “cold wallet”, that is, it uses a dedicated
hardware not connected to the Internet to store the private
keys. The hardware token communicates with the computer (or
any other device) that creates the transaction using Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) and it can review the transaction before
signing it. The securely stored private key never leaves the
BlueWallet and is only unlocked if the user correctly enters her
PIN. BlueWallet provides the desired security at the expense of
the usability, as the users have to invest and keep an additional
device while making a transaction.
Bitcoin already has a built-in function to increase the
security of its wallets called “multi-signature”, which tightens
the security by employing the splitting control technique. For
instance, BitGo - an online wallet which provides 2-of-3 multi-
signature transactions to its clients. However, the drawback
of using the multi-signature transactions is that it greatly
compromises the privacy and anonymity of the user. Authors
in [82] propose an efficient and optimal threshold Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) scheme for securing private keys.
The main idea behind the use of threshold signatures proposed
in [82] is derived from secret sharing [120], in which the
private key is split into shares. Any subset of the shares
that is equal to or greater than a predefined threshold is
able to reconstruct the private key, but any subset that is
smaller will gain no information about the key. The main
property of threshold signatures [83] is that the key is never
revealed because the participants directly construct a signature.
Recently, authors in [85] present a TrustZone6 based Bitcoin
wallet and shows that it is more resilient to the dictionary and
side-channel attacks. Although the use of TrustZone makes
use of the encrypted storage, hence the writing and reading
operations become slower.
D. Securing Bitcoin Networks
In this section, we will discuss various existing counter-
measures proposed for securing the Bitcoin’s core protocols
and its peer-to-peer networking infrastructure functionalities
6TrustZone is a technology that is used as an extension of processors and
system architectures to increase their security.
against an array of security threats some of which we have
discussed in Section III-D.
1) DDoS Attacks: In [90], authors propose a game theoretic
approach for analyzing the DDoS attacks. The game assumes
that the pools are in competition with each other because
the larger pools are always weighted more than the smaller
pools. The game exists between the pools, and each pool
tries to increase their computational cost over others, and then
it imposes a DDoS attack on the other pools. In this way,
authors draw an equilibrium condition between the players
and concludes that the larger pools will have more incentives
against the smaller pools. In [9], authors propose a “miner’s
dilemma”, again a game theoretical approach to model the
behavior of miners similar to repetitive prisoner’s dilemma.
There exist a game between the pools. The longest chain
dominates over the smaller chains and grabs the rewards by
behaving selfishly in the network. Game theory concludes that
by performing attacks, the pools actually lose the bitcoins
that they are supposed to get when compared it with the case
without attacking each other. In particular, this kind of game
theory problems is called “Tragedy of Commons”, where the
peers turn out to be rational, selfish and harm other peers for
their benefits.
In [91], authors propose Proof-of-Activity (PoA) protocol,
which is robust against a DDoS attack that could be launched
by broadcasting a large number of invalid blocks in the
network. In PoA, each block header is stored with a crypt
value and the user that stores the first transaction places this
value. These users are called “stakeholders” in the network
and they are assumed, to be honest. Any subsequent storage of
transactions in this block is done if there are valid stakeholders
associated with the block. Storage of crypt value is random
and more transactions are stored, only if more stake users are
associated with the chain. If the length of the chain is more,
trustworthiness among other peers increases and more miners
get attracted towards the chain. Hence, an adversary cannot
place a malicious block or transaction since all the nodes in
the network are governed by stakeholders.
One possible way to mitigate DDoS attacks is to use the
technique discussed in [121], which suggests the continuous
monitoring of network traffic by using browsers like Tor
or any user-defined web service. Applying machine-learning
techniques like SVM and clustering will identify which part
of the network is behaving ill. Hence that part can be isolated
from the network until debugged. Other possible methods
to protect against DDoS attacks include: (i) configure the
network in a way that malicious packets and requests from
unnecessary ports will be prohibited, (ii) implement a third
party DoS protection scheme which carefully monitors the
network and identify variations in the pattern. We believe that
similar approaches could also be implemented in future in
Bitcoin networks to countermeasure DoS attacks.
2) Time Jacking and Eclipse Attack: In this attack an
adversary alters the node time, therefore the dependency of a
node on network time can be replaced by a hardware oriented
system time. The accept time window for transactions at a
node has to be reduced, making the node recover quicker
from the attacks. Time jacking is a dreaded attack that might
split the network into multiple parts, hence it can isolate the
victim node. A set of techniques is suggested in [87] to avoid
time jacking that includes, use of the system time instead of
network time to determine the upper limit of block timestamps,
tighten the acceptable time ranges, and use only trusted peers.
Even a node can be designed to hold multiple timestamps
assuming that the attacker may not alter all the timestamps.
Furthermore, node timestamps can be made dependent on the
blockchain timestamps [87].
In [3], authors provide techniques to combat eclipse attack
which uses an additional procedure to store the IP addresses
that are trustworthy. If the users are connected to other peers
in the network, these peers are stored in “tried” variable. The
connection of the user with the peers is dependent on the
threshold of the trust factor, which varies from time to time.
The users can have special intrusion detection system to check
the misbehaving nodes in the network. The addresses which
misbehave in the network could be banned from connections.
These features can prevent the users from an eclipse attack.
In particular, having a check on the incoming and outgoing
connections from the node can reduce the effect of an eclipse
attack.
3) Refund Attacks and Transaction Malleability: In [78],
modifications are proposed in the Payment Request message
by adding information about the customer such as registered
e-mail address, delivery address, and product information. The
payment address should be unique with each Payment Request.
Each request is associated with a key, and the same key is used
for a refund. However, the use of the additional information
poses a threat to the customer privacy. The customer is no
longer involved in the information broadcast about the trans-
action, but the responsibility is to handover the refund to the
merchant. Hence all the nodes will learn about the transaction
during verification phase and can identify the attacker easily. In
particular, the idea is to provide the merchant, a set of publicly
verifiable evidence which can cryptographically prove that the
refund address received during the protocol belongs to the
same pseudonymous customer who authorized the payment.
In [122], authors propose a manual intervention process
that checks the withdrawal transactions to detect a possible
malleability attack. Any suspicious pending transactions in the
blocks can be seen as a sign of the attack. In addition, all the
transactions in the Bitcoin network should have confirmations.
In [80], authors show a case of malleability attack on “de-
posit protocol”, and provides a solution namely new deposit
protocol. Finally, the new Segregated Witness 7 (SegWit)
proposal stores transaction signatures in a separate merkle
tree, prevent unintended transaction malleability, moreover it
further enables advanced second-layer protocols such as the
Lightning Network, MAST, atomic swaps, and more. Recently.
the SegWit soft fork has been activated on the Bitcoin network.
More specifically, the SegWit activation means that Bitcoins
block size limit is replaced by a block “weight” limit, which
allows for blocks to the size of 4 MB instead of 1 MB.
4) Reducing Delays in Processing and Propagation of
Transactions: In practice, the transactions with a large number
7https : //en.bitcoin.it/wiki/SegregatedW itness
of bitcoins are not usually carried out due to the risk of losing
it or fear of fraudulent activities. Such transactions are broken
into a set of smaller transactions. However, this eventually
increases the delay in completing the transaction because the
network has to validate more number of transactions. There-
fore to reduce this delay, authors in [123] suggest performing
the payments offline through a separate type of transactions
called “micropayments” [124] and via a separate channel
called micropayment channel. This channel is not a separate
network but part of Bitcoin network itself. In a traditional
Bitcoin network, users broadcast their transaction and the
miners verify it. This happens for all the transactions and the
network might get clogged at places where a large number
of transaction exists. Also, in such situations, the network
gives preference to transactions with large denomination and
transaction fees as compared to the smaller ones. Hence, by
establishing micropayment channels, the separate dedicated
channel is allocated for the counter-parties to perform the
transaction. The basic idea is that the transaction is not
revealed until both the parties trust each other on their balances
and transactions that they wants to perform. If either of the
ones misbehaves, then the transaction is broadcasted for the
verification in the Bitcoin network. The channels obey the
Bitcoin protocols and they are established like any other
naive network routing techniques. Hence, these micro payment
channels constitute a “lightning network” within the Bitcoin
network. The advantages of using such a lightning network
are as follows:
• The technique provides high-speed payments, eliminates
the dependency on the third party to validate, reduced
load on the Bitcoin network, channels can stay open
indefinitely for the transactions, counter-parties can move
out of the agreement whenever they want, parties can sign
using multiple keys.
• Parties can broadcast their information when they want
for seeking the interference of the other miners to solve
the discrepancies.
• Parties can send their transaction over the channel without
revealing their identities to the network and the nodes
helping in routing.
Transactions propagation delay in Bitcoin network facil-
itates the double spending attack. Hence accelerating the
transaction propagation will help to reduce the probability
of performing a successful double spending attack. Authors
in [125] propose a Bitcoin Clustering Based Ping Time proto-
col (BCBPT) to reduce the transaction propagation delay by
using the proximity information (e.g., ping latencies) while
connecting to peers. Moreover, in the context of the selfish
mining attack, authors in [126] study the effect of communi-
cation delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain.
In [43], author’s provide solutions for tampering attacks. A
node can announce the time it takes to mine a block together
with the advertisement of a new block. This makes another
peer in the network to approximately estimate the average time
needed to mine a block, and hence no one can spoof by adding
unnecessary delays or tampering timestamps. Instead of static
timeouts, dynamic timeouts can make more sense since mining
time can vary from node to node. All the senders buffer the IP
addresses to which it is connecting every time, and this avoids
the IP sending same advertise messages again and again to
the same peer. A track of all the nodes has to be recorded at
every sender and pattern can be analyzed. If a transaction is
not replied by a node in a time window, then the sender could
ask other nodes to confirm the transaction.
Despite all the security threats and their solutions that we
have discussed, the number of honest miners in the network
is a factor of consideration. More the miners, more people
to verify the transactions, hence faster the block validation
process and more efficient and secure the consensus process.
As the miners are incentive driven, the reward bitcoins can
pull more miners into the process, but at the same time the
reward reduces half for every four years, hence the miners
might migrate towards other cryptocurrencies which offer
them higher rewards.
The security issues in Bitcoin are closely linked with the
transaction privacy and user anonymity. In Bitcoin right now
the users are not really anonymous. The systematic monitoring
of the Bitcoin’s unencrypted peer-to-peer network and analysis
of the public blockchain can reveal a lot of information such
as who is using Bitcoin and for what purposes. Additionally,
the use of Know Your Customer (KYC) policies and Anti-
Money Laundering (AML) regulation with network traffic
and blockchain analysis techniques, could further enhance the
quality of the extracted information. From privacy as well as
business perspectives, this is not good. For instance, users
might not necessarily want the world to know where they
spend their bitcoins, how much they own or earn. Similarly,
the businesses may not want to leak transaction details to
their competitors. Furthermore, the fact that the transaction
history of each bitcoin is traceable puts the fungibility of all
bitcoins at risk. To this end, we discuss the threats and their
existing countermeasures for enabling privacy and enhancing
anonymity for Bitcoin users in the following section.
Fig. 10. Blockchain analysis - Transaction graph
Fig. 11. Blockchain analysis - Address graph
Fig. 12. Blockchain analysis - Entity/User graph
V. PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY IN BITCOIN
The traditional banking system achieves a level of privacy
by limiting access to transactions information to the entities
involved and the trusted third party. While in Bitcoin, the
public blockchain reveals all the transaction data to any user
connected to the network. However, the privacy can still be
maintained upto certain level by breaking the flow of infor-
mation somewhere in the Bitcoin transaction processing chain.
Bitcoin achieves it by keeping public keys anonymous, i.e., the
public can see that someone is sending an amount to someone
else, but without information linking the transaction to anyone.
To further enhance the user privacy, it is advised to use a
new key pair for each transaction to keep them from being
linked to a particular user. However, linking is still possible
in multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their
inputs were owned by the same owner. Also, if the owner of a
key is revealed, there is a risk that linking could reveal other
transactions belonging to the same user. In particular, Bitcoin
offers a partial unlinkability (i.e., pseudonymity), and thus it
is possible to link a number of transactions to an individual
user by tracing the flow of money through a robust blockchain
analysis procedure. Bitcoin technology upholds itself when
it comes to the privacy, but the only privacy that exists in
Bitcoin comes from pseudonymous addresses (public keys
or their hashes) which are fragile and easily compromised
through different techniques such as Bitcoin address reuse,
“taint” analysis and tracking payments via blockchain analysis
methods, IP address monitoring nodes, web-spidering, to name
a few. Once broken, this privacy is difficult and sometimes
costly to recover. In [93] authors highlight the fact that the
Bitcoin does not have any directory to maintain the log and
other transaction-related information. However, an adversary
can associate the offline data such as emails and shipping
addresses with the online information, and it can get the
private information about the peers. In this section, we discuss
the various security threats to privacy and anonymity of the
Bitcoin users and the corresponding state-of-the-art solutions
that are proposed to enhance the same.
A. Blockchain Analysis and Deanonymization
A complete anonymity in Bitcoin is a complicated issue.
To enforce anonymity in transactions, the Bitcoin allows users
to generate multiple Bitcoin addresses and it only stores the
mapping information of a user to her Bitcoin addresses on the
user’s device. As a user can have multiple addresses, hence
an adversary who is trying to deanonymize needs to construct
a one-to-many mapping between the user and its associated
addresses. In particular, the Bitcoin users can be linked to
a set of public addresses by using a detailed blockchain
analysis procedure [127]. Authors in [93] show that the two
non-trivial networking topologies called transaction network
and user network, which provides reciprocal views of the
Bitcoin network and have possible adverse implications for
user anonymity. Similar to the work done in [93], authors
in [128] presents an evaluation for privacy concerns in Bitcoin
by analyzing the public blockchain. The analysis of blockchain
requires three pre-processing steps, which includes:
• Transaction graph: The whole blockchain could be
viewed as an acyclic transaction graph Gt = {T,E},
where T is a set of transactions stored in the blockchain,
and E is the set of unidirectional edges between these
transactions. A Gt represents the flow of bitcoins between
transactions in the blockchain over time. The set of input
and output bitcoins in a transaction can be viewed as the
weights on the edges in a Gt. In particular, each incoming
edge e ∈ E in a transaction carries a timestamp and
the number of bitcoins (Ci) that forms an input for that
transaction. Figure 10 shows an instance of transaction
graph for a set of transactions stored in the blockchain.
• Address graph: By traversing the transaction graph we
can easily infer the relationship between various input
and output Bitcoin addresses, and using these relations
we can generate an address graph, Ga = {P,E′}, where
P is the set of Bitcoin addresses and E′ are the edges
connecting these addresses. Figure 11 shows an address
graph derived from Figure 11.
• User/entity graph: By using the address graph along with
a number of heuristics which are derived from Bitcoin
protocols, the next step is to create an entity graph by
grouping addresses that seem to be belonging to the same
user. The entity graph, Ge = {U,E′′}, where U is a
disjoint subset of public keys (p) such that p ∈ P and E′′
are the edges connecting different U ′s to show a directed
connectivity between them. Figure 12 shows the entity
graph derived from Figure 11 based on a set of heuristics.
In [128], authors introduce two heuristics that are derived
directly from Bitcoin protocols or its common practices. The
first is the most widely used heuristic that provides an adequate
level of linkability and it heavily depends on the implementa-
tion details of Bitcoin protocols, and are termed as idioms
of use as mentioned in [129]. The idioms of use assumes
that all the inputs in a transaction are generated by the same
user because in practice different users rarely contribute in a
single, collaborative transaction. This heuristic also supports
the fact that transitive closure can be applied to the transaction
graph to yield clusters of Bitcoin addresses. For instance, by
applying the above heuristic along with its transitive property
on Figure 10, one can assume that transactions Tx2 and
Tx3 are initiated by the same user as both shares a common
input p5, hence the addresses ranging from p3 to p6 could
belong to the same user. The second heuristic links the input
addresses of a transaction to its output addresses by assuming
that these outputs as change addresses if an output address
is completely new (i.e., the address has never appeared in
the past and it will not be seen in the blockchain to be re-
used to receive payments). In Figure 11, the addresses p14
and p18 satisfy the second heuristic, and thus these addresses
can be clustered with their inputs as shown in the Figure 12.
Authors in [129] argued that the aforementioned heuristics
are prone to errors, in cases where the implementation of
Bitcoin protocols change with time, and the traditional Bitcoin
network also changes which now consists of more number of
mining pools instead of single users. Due to these facts, it is
possible that the entity graph might contain a large number
of false positives in the clustering process, hence it leads to
the further refinements in the above heuristics. To reduce the
false positives, authors in [129] suggest the manual inspection
process to identify the usage patterns induced by Bitcoin ser-
vices (such as SatoshiDice). For instance, SatoshiDice requires
that the payouts use the same address, therefore if a user
spent coins using a change address, the address would receive
another input which invalidates the one-time receive property
of a change address. Furthermore, in [117] authors exploit
the multi-signature addressing technique for the purpose of
adverse effect on the user privacy. Authors conclude that even
if the Bitcoin addresses are changed, the structure of the
change address in a multi-signature transaction can be matched
to its input addresses.
Apart from using the adaptable and refined heuristics to
match with the constantly changing blockchain usage patterns
and Bitcoin services, the adversary needs to take further steps
to link the address clusters with the real-world identities once
an entity graph with low false positives is created. Authors
in [129] perform with high precision the linking of clusters
with the online wallets, vendors, and other service providers
as one can do several interactions with these entities and
learn at least one associated address. However, identifying
regular users is difficult with the same approach, but the
authors also suggest that authorities with subpoena power
might even be able to identify individual users since most of
the transaction flow passes through their centralized servers.
These servers usually require keeping records for customer
identities. Furthermore, the use of side-channel information
is considered helpful in mapping the addresses. For instance,
WikiLeaks, Silk Road, to name a few, uses publicly known
addresses, and many service providers such as online sellers
or exchange services require the user identity before providing
a service. One can also make use of the web crawlers (such as
bitcointalk.org) that searches the social networks for Bitcoin
addresses [130] [131].
A commercial approach for blockchain analysis could be
to use the software BitIodine [132] that offers an automated
blockchain analysis framework. Due to its rapid growth in
such a short span of time, the Bitcoin networks has become
of great interest to governments and law enforcement agencies
all over the world to track down the illicit transactions. By
predicting that there is a huge market potential for Bitcoin,
various companies such as Elliptic, Chainalysis, Numisight,
Skry, to name a few, are specializing in “bitcoin blockchain
analysis” models. These companies provide a set of tools to
analyze the blockchain to identify illicit activities and even
help to identify the Bitcoin users in the process. Authors
in [133] propose BitConeView, a graphical tool for the visual
analysis of bitcoins flow in a blockchain. BitConeView allows
to graphically track how bitcoins from the given sources
(i.e., transaction inputs) are spent over time by means of
transactions and are eventually stored at multiple destinations
(i.e., unspent transaction outputs).
Recently, authors in [134] analyze the impact of online
tracking on the privacy of Bitcoin users. The paper shows
that if a user purchases by paying with cryptocurrency such
as bitcoins, an adversary can uniquely identify the transaction
on the blockchain by making use of the third-party trackers
which typically possess enough information about the pur-
chase. Latter, these transactions could be linked to the user
cookies and then with the real identity of a user, and user’s
purchase history is revealed. Furthermore, if the tracker is able
to link the two purchases of the same user to the blockchain
in this manner, it can identify the user’s entire cluster of
Bitcoin addresses and transactions on the blockchain through
the use of standard tracking software and blockchain analysis
techniques. The authors show that these attacks are resilient
against the existing blockchain anonymity techniques such as
CoinJoin [96]. Also, these attacks are passive, hence can be
retroactively applied to past purchases as well.
Finally, network de-anonymization could be used to link an
IP address to a user in the Bitcoin’s P2P network because while
broadcasting a transaction the node leaks its IP address. Same
as the blockchain analysis, a rigorous way to link IP addresses
to hosts is by exploiting the network related information that
can be collected by just observing the network. Over the
years, multiple deanonymization attacks in which an adversary
uses a “supernode” that connects with the active peers and
listen to the transaction traffic relayed by honest nodes in
the network [94] [135] [93] are proposed. By exploiting the
symmetric diffusion of transactions over the network, it is
possible to link the Bitcoin users’ public keys to their IP
addresses with an accuracy of nearly 30% [94]. Moreover,
the use of “supernode” for linking is trivial, hence it exploits
only minimal knowledge of the P2P graph structure and
the structured randomness of diffusion. Therefore, we can
hypothesize that even higher accuracies could be achieved by
using more sophisticated network traffic analyzing techniques.
B. Proposals for enabling privacy and improving anonymity
Privacy is not defined as an inherent property in
Bitcoin initial design, but it is strongly associated
with the system. Therefore, in recent years an array
of academic research [128] [144] [145] [132] which
shows various privacy-related weaknesses in the
current Bitcoin protocol(s) has been surfaced. This
research triggered a large set of privacy-enhancing
technologies [144] [146] [92] [141] [143] [147] [136] [140]
aiming at strengthening privacy and improving anonymity
without breaking Bitcoin fundamental design principles. In
this section, we discuss these state-of-the-art protocols which
work toward the enhancement of privacy and anonymity in
Bitcoin.
Based on the aforementioned discussion in Section V, it
is evident that the public nature of the blockchain poses
a significant threat to the privacy of Bitcoin users. Even
worse, since funds can be tracked and tainted, no two coins
are equal, and fungibility, a fundamental property required
in every currency, is at risk. With these threats in mind,
several privacy-enhancing technologies have been proposed
to improve transaction privacy in Bitcoin. The state-of-the-
art proposals (refer tables IV and V) for enabling privacy
in cryptocurrencies can be broadly classified into three major
categories namely, Peer-to-peer mixing protocols, Distributed
mixing networks, and Altcoins.
1) Peer-to-peer mixing protocols: Mixers are anonymous
service providers, that uses mixing protocols to confuse the
trails of transactions. In mixing process, the client’s funds are
divided into smaller parts. These parts are mixed at random
with similar random parts of other clients, and you end up with
completely new coins. This helps to break any link between the
user and the coins she purchased. However, mixers are not an
integral part of Bitcoin, but various mixing services are heavily
used to enhance the anonymity and unlinkability in the system.
In peer-to-peer (P2P) mixing protocols [148] [139] [97], a
set of untrusted Bitcoin users simultaneously broadcast their
messages to create a series of transactions without requiring
any trusted third party. The main feature of a P2P mixing
protocol is to ensure sender anonymity within the set of
participants by permuting ownership of their coins. The goal is
to prevent an attacker which controls a part of the network or
some of the participating users to associate a transaction to its
corresponding honest sender. The degree of anonymity in P2P
protocols depends on the number of users in the anonymity
set.
Table IV shows a range of P2P mixing protocols along with
their brief description, advantages, and disadvantages in terms
of user anonymity and transaction security. CoinJoin [96],
a straightforward protocol for implementing P2P mixing, it
aims to enhance privacy and securely prevent thefts. Figure 13
shows CoinJoin basic idea with an example in which two
transactions (i.e., tx1 and tx2) are joined into one while
inputs and outputs are unchanged. In CoinJoin, a set of users
with agreed (via their primary signatures) inputs and outputs
create a standard Bitcoin transaction such that no external
adversary knows which output links with which input, hence
it ensures external unlinkability. To prevent theft, a user only
signs a transaction if its desired output appears in the output
addresses of the transaction. In this way, CoinJoin makes
the multiple inputs of a transaction independent from each
other, thus it breaks the basic heuristic from Section V-A (i.e.,
inputs of a transaction belong to the same user). However,
CoinJoin has few major drawbacks, which includes limited
scalability and privacy leakage due to the need of managing
signatures of the involved participants in the mixing set, the
requirement of signing a transaction by all its participants
make CoinJoin vulnerable to DoS attacks, and to create a
mix each participant has to share their signature and output
addresses within the participating set which causes internal
unlinkability. To address the internal unlinkability issue and
to increase the robustness to DoS attacks, authors in [97]
propose CoinShuffle, a decentralized protocol that coordinates
CoinJoin transactions using a cryptographic mixing technique.
Later, an array of protocols [136] [137] [139] are built on the
concept of either CoinJoin or CoinShuffle that enhances the
P2P mixing by providing various improvements, that includes
resistance to DoS, sybil, and intersection attacks, plausible
deniability, low mixing time, and scalability of the mixing
groups.
2) Distributed mixing networks: Authors in [141] propose
MixCoin, a third-party mixing protocol to facilitate anony-
mous payments in Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies. The
MixCoin uses the emergent phenomenon of currency mixes,
in which a user shares a number of coins with a third-party
mix using a standard-sized transaction, and it receives back
the same number of coins from the mix that is submitted
by some other user, hence it provides strong anonymity
from external entries. MixCoin uses a reputation-based crypto-
graphic accountability technique to prevent other users within
the mix from theft and disrupting the protocol. However,
mixes might steal the user coins at any time or become a
threat to the user anonymity because the mix will know the
internal mapping between the users and outputs. To provide
internal unlinkability (i.e., preventing the mix from learning
input-output linking) in MixCoin, authors in [142] proposes
BlindCoin which extends the MixCoin protocol by using blind
signatures to create user inputs and cryptographically blinded
outputs called blinded tokens. However, to achieve this internal
unlinkability, BlindCoin requires two extra transactions to
publish and redeem the blinded tokens, and the threat of theft
from the mix is still present.
Recently, in [143] authors propose TumbleBit, a Bitcoin-
compatible unidirectional unlinkable payment hub that allows
Fig. 13. Example: CoinJoin basic idea
peers to make fast, off-blockchain payments anonymously
through an untrusted intermediary called Tumbler. Similar to
Chaumian original eCash protocol [149], TumbleBit enforces
anonymity in the mixing by ensuring that no one, not even
the Tumbler, can link a transaction of its sender to its receiver.
The mixing of payments from 800 users shows that TumbleBit
provides strong anonymity and theft resistance and it is
scalable.
3) Bitcoin extensions or Altcoins: Bitcoin has not just been
a most popular cryptocurrency in today’s market, but it ushers
a wave of other cryptocurrencies that are built on decentralized
peer-to-peer networks. In fact, the Bitcoin has become the
de facto standard for the other cryptocurrencies. The other
currencies which are inspired by Bitcoin are collectively
known as altcoins. Instead of proposing techniques (such as
mixing and shuffling) to increase transaction anonymity and
user privacy, the altcoins work as an extension to Bitcoin or
a full-fledged currency. The popular altcoins along with their
brief description have been shown in Table V. Some of these
currencies are easier to mine than Bitcoin however, there are
tradeoffs, including greater risk brought on by lesser liquidity,
acceptance, and value retention.
Authors in [150] propose ZeroCoin, a cryptographic ex-
tension to Bitcoin which provides anonymity by design by
applying zero-knowledge proofs which allow fully encrypted
transactions to be confirmed as valid. It is believed that this
new property could enable entirely new classes of blockchain
applications to be built. In ZeroCoin, a user can simply wash
the linkability traces from its coins by exchanging them for
an equal value of ZeroCoins. But unlike the aforementioned
mixing approaches, the user should not have to ask for the
exchange to a mixing set, instead, the user can itself generate
the ZeroCoins by proving that she owns the equal value of
bitcoins via the Zerocoin protocol. For instance, Alice can
prove to others that she owns a bitcoin and is thus eligible to
spend any other bitcoin. For this purpose, first, she produces a
secure commitment, i.e., the zerocoin, which is recorded in the
blockchain so that others can validate it. In order to spend a
bitcoin, she broadcasts a zero-knowledge proof for the respec-
tive zerocoin, together with a transaction. The zero-knowledge
cryptography protects Alice from linking the zerocoin to her.
Still, the other participants can verify the transaction and
the proof. Instead of a linked list of Bitcoin transactions,
Zerocoin introduces intermediate steps. In this way, the use of
zero-knowledge proofs prevent the transaction graph analyses.
Unfortunately, even though Zerocoins properties may seem
appealing, it is computationally complex, bloats the blockchain
and requires protocol modifications. However, it demonstrates
an alternative, privacy-aware approach. Currently, ZeroCoin
derives both its anonymity and security against counterfeiting
from strong cryptographic assumptions at the cost of substan-
tially increased computational complexity and size.
An extension of ZeroCoin called ZeroCash (also know as
Zcash) is presented by [146]. ZeroCash uses an improved
version of zero-knowledge proof (in terms of functionality
and efficiency) called zk-SNARKs, which hides additional
information about transactions such as the amount and recip-
ient addresses to achieve strong privacy guarantees. However,
ZeroCash relies on a trusted setup for generation of secret
parameters required for SNARKs implementation, it requires
protocol modifications, and the blockchain pruning is not
possible. Recently, authors in [152] propose MimbleWimble,
an altcoin that supports confidential transactions (CT). The
CTs can be aggregated non-interactively and even across
blocks, thus greatly increases the scalability of the underlying
blockchain. However, such aggregation alone does not ensure
input-output unlinkability against parties who perform the
aggregation, e.g., the miners. Additionally, Mimblewimble is
not compatible with smart contracts due to the lack of script
support.
Beyond Bitcoin, the so-called second generation of cryp-
tocurrencies, such as Ethereum (Ether), Mastercoin (MSC),
Counterparty (XCP) are introduced in the market. These
cryptocurrencies implement a new transaction syntax with a
fully-fledged scripting language written in Turing complete
language. Furthermore, these cryptocurrencies understood the
digital assets in terms of smart contracts and colored coins.
Unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum was designed to be much more than
TABLE IV
TECHNIQUES FOR IMPROVING PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY IN BITCOIN
Proposals Type/Class Distinct features and properties Advantages Disadvantages
CoinJoin [96] P2P uses multi-signature transactions to
enhance privacy
prevent thefts, lower per-
transaction fee
anonymity level depends on the
number of participants, vulnerable
to DoS (by stalling joint transac-
tions), sybil and intersection at-
tacks, prevents plausible deniabil-
ity
CoinShuffle [97] P2P decentralized protocol for
coordinating CoinJoin transactions
through a cryptographic mixing
protocol
internal unlinkability, robust to
DoS attacks, theft resistance
lower anonymity level and deni-
ability, prone to intersection and
sybil attacks
Xim [92] P2P anonymously partnering and multi-
round mixing
distributed pairing, internal unlink-
ability, thwarts sybil and DoS at-
tacks
higher mixing time
CoinShuffle++ /
DiceMix [136]
P2P based on CoinJoin concept, optimal
P2P mixing solution to improve
anonymity in crypto-currencies
low mixing time (8 secs
for 50 peers), resistant to
deanonymization attack, ensures
sender anonymity and termination
vulnerable to DoS and sybil at-
tacks, limited scalability, no sup-
port for Confidential Transactions
(CT)
ValueShuffle [137] P2P based on CoinShuffle++ concept,
uses Confidential Transactions
mixing approach to achieve
comprehensive transaction privacy
unlinkability, CT compatibility and
theft resistance, normal payment
using ValueShuffle needs only one
transaction
vulnerable to DoS and sybil at-
tacks, limited scalability
Dandelion [138] P2P networking policy to
prevent network-facilitated
deanonymization of Bitcoin
users
provides strong anonymity even in
the presence of multiple adver-
saries
vulnerable to DoS and sybil attacks
SecureCoin [139] P2P based on CoinParty concept, an
efficient and secure protocol for
anonymous and unlinkable Bitcoin
transactions
protect against sabotage attacks, at-
tempted by any number of partic-
ipating saboteurs, low mixing fee,
deniability
vulnerable to DoS attacks, limited
scalability
CoinParty [140] partially
P2P
based on CoinJoin concept, uses
threshold ECDSA and decryption
mixnets to combine pros of central-
ized and decentralized mixes in a
single system
improves on robustness,
anonymity, scalability and
deniability, no mixing fee
partially prone to coin theft and
DoS attack, high mixing time, re-
quires separate honest mixing peers
MixCoin [141] Distributed third-party mixing with account-
ability
DoS and sybil resistance partial internal unlinkability and
theft resistance,
BlindCoin [142] Distributed based on MixCoin concept, uses
blind signature scheme to ensure
anonymity
internal unlinkability, DoS and
sybil resistance
partial theft resistance, additional
costs and delays in mixing process
TumbleBit [143] Distributed undirectional unlinkable payment
hub that uses an untrusted interme-
diary
prevents theft, anonymous, resists
intersection, sybil and DoS, scal-
able (implemented with 800 users)
normal payment using TumbleBit
needs at least two sequential trans-
actions
a payment system. In particular, it is a decentralized platform
that runs smart contracts, which are the applications that run
exactly as programmed without any possibility of downtime,
censorship, fraud or third-party interference. This implies
that these digital assets can be used to realize sophisticated
financial instruments such as stocks with automatic dividend
payouts or to manage and trade physical properties such as
a house. Most of these next-generation coins work on top of
Bitcoins blockchain and are therefore also known as on-chain
currencies. Since they encode their transactions into Bitcoins
transactions, they lack the validation of transactions by miners,
because Bitcoin miners do not understand the new transaction
types. For this purpose, a new protocol layer is built upon
Bitcoins strong foundation and its security. Furthermore, it is
seen as an increase in Bitcoins value from which both will
profit. As a detailed discussion on the altcoins is out of the
scope of our work, we direct interested readers to the existing
literature such as [20] and [157].
As a summary, in this section, the Bitcoin’s privacy and
anonymity concerns have been discussed. It is observed that
Bitcoin is pseudo-anonymous as the account is tied to the ran-
dom and multiple Bitcoin addresses and not to the individual
users. With the rapidly increasing popularity of bitcoins, the
need for privacy and anonymity protection also increases, and
it must be ensured that the users will receive a satisfactory
level of service in terms of privacy, security, and anonymity.
VI. SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
DIRECTIONS
After our comprehensive survey on the security and privacy
aspects of Bitcoin and its major related techniques, we now
summarize our lessons learned, before presenting the possible
future challenges and research directions. Some of these are
already discussed in previous sections. However, remaining
challenges and open research issues are dealt in brief in this
section.
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF ALTCOINS
Proposals Distinct features and properties Advantages Disadvantages
ZeroCoin /
ZeroCash /
Zcash [150] [146]
a cryptographic extension to Bit-
coin , unlinkable and untraceable
transactions by using zero knowl-
edge proofs
provides internal unlinkability,
theft and DoS resistance
relies on a trusted setup and non-
falsifiable cryptographic assump-
tions, blockchain pruning is not
possible
CryptoNote [151] relies on ring signatures to provide
anonymity
provides strong privacy and
anonymity guarantees
higher computational complexity,
not compatible with pruning
MimbleWimble [152]
[153]
a design for a cryptocurrency with
confidential transactions
CT compatibility, improve privacy,
fungibility and scalability
vulnerable to DoS attacks, not
compatible with smart contracts
ByzCoin [154] Bitcoin-like cryptocurrency with
strong consistency via collective
signing
lower consensus latency and high
transaction throughput, resistance
to selfish and stubborn mining [8],
eclipse and delivery-tampering and
double-spending attacks
vulnerable to slow down or tempo-
rary DoS attack and 51% attack,
Ethereum
(ETH) [155]
uses proof-of-stake, open-ended
decentralized software platform
that enables Smart Contracts and
Distributed Applications
run without any downtime, fraud,
control or interference from a third
party, support developers to build
and publish distributed applications
scalability issues (uses complex
network), running untrusted code,
limited (i.e., non-turing-complete)
scripting language
Mastercoin (or
Omni) [156]
uses enhanced Bitcoin Core ad
Proof of Authenticity, Colored
coins, Exodus address
Easy to use, secure web wallets
available, Escrow fund (insurance
against panic), Duress protection
using a trusted entity
wallets handling the transactions
should aware of the concept of col-
ored coins, possibility to acciden-
tally uncolor colored coin assets
exists
Litecoin (LTC, lite-
coin.org)
uses Segwit, which allows tech-
nologies like Lightning Network
scalable, low transaction mining
time, anonymous and cheaper
very few stores accept payment in
Litecoins, high power consumption
Dash (DASH, dash-
pay.io)
uses Proof of Service, implements
native CoinJoin like transactions
higher privacy (mixes transactions
using master nodes), InstantX pro-
vides faster transaction processing
less liquid,technology is too young,
does not yet have a critical mass of
merchants or users
Ripple (XRP, rip-
ple.com)
implements a novel low-latency
consensus algorithm based on
byzantine agreement protocol
fast transaction validation, less
energy-intensive, no 51% attack
not fully decentralized, vulnera-
ble to attacks such as consensus
split, transaction flood and software
backdoor
Monero (XMR, get-
monero.org)
based on the CryptoNote protocol, improves user privacy by using ring
signatures, lower transaction pro-
cessing time (average every 2 min-
utes)
transaction linkability could be
achieved by leveraging the ring sig-
nature size of zero, output merging,
temporal analysis
Counterparty (XCP,
counterparty.io)
created and distributed by destroy-
ing bitcoins in a process known as
proof of burn
same as bitcoins same as bitcoins
With the use of proof-of-work based consensus algorithm
and a secure timestamping service, Bitcoin provides a prac-
tical solution to the Byzantine Generals problem. However,
to achieve distributed consensus, Bitcoin exposes itself to
a number of security threats. The main threat is double
spending (or race attacks) which will always be possible
in the Bitcoin. The transparency in the system is provided
by using an unforgeable distributed ledger (i.e., blockchain),
which holds all the transactions ever processed, in such a way
that anyone can verify their integrity and authenticity. But,
at the same time, this transparency introduces a ubiquitous
global attacker model. Hence, we can be deduced from the
discussion presented in Section V that Bitcoin is anything
but private. Nevertheless, Bitcoin provides pseudonymity by
hiding identities and the research community is putting a lot of
efforts to further strengthen this property. For instance, use of
commitment schemes such as zero-knowledge proofs greatly
improves unlinkability and untraceability in transactions.
One of the major contribution of Bitcoin is the degree
of transparency and decentralization, that it provides along
with the adequate level of security and privacy, which was
previously deemed impossible. The original concept of mining,
which could be based on proof of work, proof of stake,
proof of burns or some other scheme, not only secures the
blockchain but it eventually achieves the distributed consensus.
In particular, the most important steps that make the whole
process so cohesive includes, the way these schemes binds
the votes to something valuable, give rewards in exchange
to pay for these valuables, and at the same time controls
the supply of the cryptocurrencies in the system. Without
these mining schemes, the fake identities would be able to
easily disturb (through sybil attack) the consensus process and
destroy the system. Due to this, i.e., availability of a mining
based consensus protocol, we can safely conclude that 51%
attacks are the worst case scenario for Bitcoin. However, the
rapidly increasing mining pools threatens the decentralization
of Bitcoin.
In the near future it is hard to comment on the survivability
of the Bitcoin, i.e., whether Bitcoin can and will stay as robust
as it is today. In particular, the scalability of the network,
the continuously decreasing rewards, increasing transaction
fee, and the security and privacy threats are the pressing
issues, which needs to be addressed. The peer-to-peer network
already seems to be having the symptoms of degradation,
which can be seen in terms of propagation delay for both, the
new transaction generated by a user and the newly validated
block by a miner. This network propagation delay becomes,
particularly a major issue, because the Bitcoins security as-
sumptions heavily rely on the fast propagation of transactions
and blocks. Therefore, it is very important that the Bitcoin
network is easy to scale to more participants and it is able to
handle higher transaction rates. In case of the subsiding mining
rewards, the research community is unsure whether this poses
a real problem or if fees are able to provide the necessary
incentive. So far, various improvements and altcoins have been
implemented to resolve the aforementioned issues (please refer
to tables IV and V. However, it remains unclear which of the
alternative approaches are most promising in terms of practical
implementation that will actually improve Bitcoin.
From the improvement perspective, Bitcoin can consider
all the altcoins as a huge testing environment, from which
it can borrow novel techniques and functionalities to address
its weaknesses. At least in the recent future, the Bitcoin will
be constantly evolving and will be in the under development
phase, hence we now present few research directions that could
be exploited in this direction.
• Game theory and stability: Recall that mining pools
consist of individual miners who pool their hashing
power as well as their incentives. Miners can behave
selfishly by holding on to their blocks and releasing it
whenever they want. This kind of selfish behavior may
pose a game theoretic problem between the selfish miners
and the network. Since all the miners perform with a
notion of increasing their incentives, a game theoretic
approach is well suited for achieving Nash equilibrium
among miners (i.e., players) [158]. Attackers may try to
contribute to an increase of their chain length compared to
honest chain in the network. This poses a game between
the honest chain miners and the malicious miners, thus
achieving equilibrium to bring stability in the network
is a possible research direction. There are numerous
proposals [158] [159] [160] which shows that the use of
the game-theoretic approaches provide useful information
about the effects of selfish mining, block withholding
and discarding attacks, and the incentive distribution
problem in the mining pools. Therefore, we believe that
this approach could be effectively used for modeling the
various issues and providing adequate solutions for the
identified issues related to the mining pools.
• Cryptographic and keying techniques: The Simpli-
fied Payment Verification (SPV) protocol which is a
lightweight protocol used for the verification of the trans-
action sent from a user [161], and it is often vulnerable
to attacks like sybil and double spending. A more robust
verification protocol is a current requirement. For the key
manipulations and calculations, a distributed approach
is always preferred more than the centralized one. This
is to avoid the point of failure or the central server
under the risk of an attack. Hence, in this direction, the
innovative means of key computation and storage of the
bitcoins in a distributed fashion is a possible research
direction. Additionally, the Bitcoin protocols use EDCSA
and hash functions like SHA-256 which creates another
research scope as there is always an adequate requirement
to improve these algorithms or implement novel keying
and hashing techniques. We have seen the use of cluster
or group keys which are based on some threshold in
order to solve various attacks. For instance, fix a group
head and get an additional signature or authentication
on every transaction [144]. Another approach is to use
“trusted paths” which is based on hardware that allows
users to read and write a few cryptographic data [144].
Finally, there are few techniques which use Bloom filters
for securing wallets. Nevertheless, filters might lead to
false positives and false negatives that will consume the
network bandwidth, thus reducing it can be a potential
research directive.
• Improving blockchain protocol: Blockchain provides for
the first time a probabilistic solution to the Byzantine
Generals problem [162], where consensus is reached
over time (after confirmations) and makes use of eco-
nomic incentives to secure the functionality of the overall
infrastructure. The blockchain technology promises to
revolutionize the way we conduct business. For instance,
blockchain startups have received more than one bil-
lion dollars [163] of venture capital money to exploit
this technology for applications such as voting, record
keeping, contracts, to name a few. Despite its potential,
blockchain protocol faces significant concerns in terms of
its privacy [164] and scalability [32] [165]. The append-
only nature of the blockchain is essential to the security
of the Bitcoin ecosystem as transactions are stored in the
ledger forever and are immutable. However, an immutable
ledger is not appropriate for all new applications that
are being envisaged for the blockchain. Recently, authors
in [166] present modification in blockchain techniques
that allows operation such as re-writing one or more
blocks, compressing any number of blocks into a smaller
number of blocks, and inserting one or more blocks.
• Fastness: Bitcoin’s proof of work is designed to val-
idate a new block on average every 10 minutes, and
it is recommended to wait for six confirmations before
accepting a transaction [167], which makes it impractical
for many real-world applications (e.g., a point of sale
payments). Faster mining with the same robustness such
as one proposed in [154] is a future requirement. Recently
authors in [168] present Proof of Luck, an efficient
blockchain consensus protocol to achieve low-latency
transaction validation, deterministic confirmation time,
negligible energy consumption, and equitably distributed
mining.
• Incentives for miners: In general, incentives can be either
fixed or variable depending on the complexity of the puz-
zle that miners solve. A variable incentive may increase
the competition between the miners and help to solve
puzzles that are challenging. The miners who inform the
malfunctions and other illegal behavior in the network
can be awarded additional coins as a reward. This act will
increase the number of honest nodes in the network. In
the world of growing demand for the cryptocurrencies,
there is a lot of competition for bitcoins or any other
digital currency to retain its popularity in the market.
Additionally, miners may migrate by looking at the
rewards given by the other competitors or by the fact that
for every four years the incentives are halved. Therefore,
essential questions that need addressing includes, how to
make the miners fix to a currency in such a competitive
environment, and what are the other incentives the Bitcoin
system can think of to attract the miners.
• Smart contracts and preventing backtracks: Smart con-
tract refers to the computer programs that embody a
self-executing and self-enforcing contract to which users
may become a party, by interacting with it electronically.
These contracts are of particular interest to those in the
financial sector. However, the concept of smart contract is
not a new one, but the advent of blockchain technology
spurred interest in it because the blockchain eliminates
the need to rely on a trusted third party to “execute” the
contract, and enables to use of cryptocurrency as “pro-
grammable money”. Bitcoins support for smart contracts
is extremely limited. Recently authors in [169] propose
Hawk, which uses a blockchain model of cryptography
to generate privacy-preserving smart contracts. Similar
to Bitcoin, authors in [170] proposes Enigma, a decen-
tralized computation platform which provides a highly
optimized version of secure multi-party computation with
guaranteed privacy to effectively execute smart contracts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Bitcoin has already evinced a popular digital currency in the
market. However, the fame of Bitcoin has attracted antagonists
to use Bitcoin network for their selfish motives and benefits.
Today we have approximately 1146 different cryptocurrencies
in action, out of which many are a recent introduction to the
market. From all these fiat-currencies, the outstanding popu-
larity and high market capital of bitcoins make it attractive
for adversaries to launch various security threats. According
to our survey, even though the construction of the Bitcoin
protocols with proof-of-work and consensus to protect the user
actions are the robust features in Bitcoin, these itself becoming
a point of manipulation for cyber thieves. Starting from packet
sniffing to the double spending, the Bitcoin is dreaded with
various attacks. Though literature provides solutions against
few of these attacks, the robust and effective security solutions
that can ensure proper functioning of Bitcoin in the future
are still absent. Together with security, the distributed nature
of Bitcoin blockchain has lead glitches in the privacy and
anonymity requirements of the users. In summary, this paper
is a sole attempt towards highlighting the security and privacy
issues in different fields of Bitcoin. Once presenting the
major components of Bitcoin, its basic characteristics and
related concepts, in brief, our survey mainly focuses on the
security and privacy aspects that can be found at various
stages in the Bitcoin system, starting from transaction creation
to its successful addition in the blockchain. We studied and
emphasize the issue of user privacy and anonymity in this
rapidly growing e-commerce industry. With the set of future
research directions and open questions that we have raised, we
hope that our work will motivate fledgling researchers towards
tackling the security and privacy issues of Bitcoin systems.
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